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Diaspora and Disaster
3/11 as a Starting Point of Connecting both Fields of Research
This volume brings together two topics and frameworks of research which up
to now have rarely been connected. First a distinct “disasterology” has dealt
with the preconditions and consequences of disaster1, and especially social an-
thropology has contributed strongly to a deeper understanding of disasters as
social catastrophes. Second we find a fashionable and not as well defined field
of research in diaspora studies. Diaspora studies have been taken up by social
and cultural anthropology, literature studies, sociology and many more in the
humanities. Only lately have both fields of disaster research and diaspora stud-
ies been treated together by a few papers as in the case of Haitians in the USA
trying to come to terms with the Haiti earthquake in 2010 (Esnard and Sapard
2011). These papers have proven the potential of grouping disaster and dias-
pora together, but have only partially lived up to the possibilities that lie within
this approach. With our volume on the triple catastrophe in Northern Japan in
March 2011 and the reaction of Japanese abroad we try tomove one step further.
The researchfields of disaster anddiaspora both have certain blind spotswhich
are somehow complimentary to each other. First, disaster research tends to think
along national borders. As a consequence disasters are analyzed as national
catastrophes.2 It is true that nation-states form the most efficient institutions
to react to disasters unless the state has been very weak already before. They are
responsible for preparation andmitigation of disasters or the failure in these two
dimensions. Since disasters are not natural catastrophes as media often claims
but are conditioned by social circumstances (Bakoff, Frerks, Hillhorst 2004: 1) it
is evident that the state should be the starting point for analysis.
1 Especially Oliver-Smith (1986, 1999, 2004) has been a leading researcher of disaster in social an-
thropology while others like Alexander (1997) have also made important contributions to the
research of disasters as social-natural catastrophes.
2 For example Alexander (1997: 25) claims: “In a sense, a disaster is symptomatic of the condition of
a society’s total adaptional strategywithin its social, exonomic,modified, and build environments.”
He thus supposes that disasters are only symptoms for the condition of the very society hit by them.
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In the case of 3/11, as the triple catastrophe is often referred to as the ini-
tial earthquake occurred on March 11th 2011 and also because the term resem-
bles 9/11, Japan was basically well prepared to meet natural catastrophes like
earthquakes, taifuns and tsunamis. Experts estimated the probability of a ma-
jor tsunami caused by an earthquake on the coast of Sanriku, the name for the
north-eastern region of the main island Honshū, to be around 90% (Tagsold
2013a: 609). Accordingly inhabitants knew how to react and practiced how to
most effectively evacuate. However, the actual tsunami’s dimensions exceeded
all scientific predictions. Nevertheless the Japanese state proved its resilience
during March 2011 as the impact of the natural disaster in terms of casualties as
well as destruction would havemuchmore severe inmost other countries. How-
ever the third catastrophe, the meltdown at the nuclear power plant Fukushima
Daiichi came unexpectedly and led to chaos.
Up to this, disasterology has treated 3/11 mostly as a purely Japanese mat-
ter and thus has not enlightened the blind spot by extending its research beyond
national borders of Japan.3 Books and papers have dealt with the various dimen-
sions of the disaster like living in shelters, food safety, reconstruction of cities,
ports and infrastructure in general and of course Fukushima. But the disaster has
a strong transnational dimension, which hasmore or less been neglected. First of
all Northern Japan housed a significant number ofmigrants inMarch 2011 (Tag-
sold 2013b: 182f.). Even though migration to Japan always has been seriously
curbed by the government, the country does not seclude itself from the trends of
globalization. Chinese nationals worked on the farms in rural Northern Japan,
as Japanese tend to leave for the big cities since wages on the countryside are
low and work is hard and dirty. Nevertheless, these jobs seemed to offer op-
portunities for migrants. On the coast many Filipinas had married fishermen
who otherwise faced difficulties finding partners for marriage in Japan. These
migrants and others have widely been neglected in studies concerning the Triple
Disaster, as somehow the assumption as well as public image is that the disaster
had hit a Japanese island that is populated solely by Japanese.
3 See for examples the papers in Kingston (2012).
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Yet another transnational dimension of the disaster is constituted by the Fuku-
shima nuclear power plant. One of the common implicit assumptions in public
media was that the Fukushima power plant is a purely Japanese achievement.
Hence everything regarding these nuclear reactors was explained by referring to
some Japanese national character. The Japanese have full faith in technical solu-
tions to overcome even themost severe disasters. But the walls, which were built
to stop tsunami-waves, failed – and so too did the power plant in Fukushima.
Nature had overcome human – that is Japanese – hybris, so it was argued. As far
as the power plants are concerned however, research has clearly outlined their
transnational background (see for example Yoshioka 1999). The US advertised
nuclear power as safe and as the energy of the future in the 1950s and 60s in
Japan in order to strengthen one of their last reliable allies in East Asia (Kuznick
2011, Tanaka 2011). Themultinational company General Electrics built the first
nuclear reactor in Fukushima and cooperatedwith Toshiba in building two addi-
tional reactors, only the last three reactors were built solely by Japanese compa-
nies. But the transnational networks are not only historical – they also reached
out globally in March 2011, a point less explored by experts on Japanese nu-
clear power politics. For example the reaction of the US marines moving their
ships away from Fukushima or closer back was one of the often quoted events
in media to determine how dangerous the incident might be. Also the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna played an important role in defining
the disaster in Fukushima. Even though studies of the disaster partly grasped
the transnational character of 3/11 for Fukushima they nevertheless fell short in
consequently asking the same questions about the disaster.
Diaspora studies have far less problems with transnational dimensions. The
framework of analysis is based on the very question of overcoming national
boarders. After all, as Nico Besnier in his introductory paper stresses, diaspora
studies have their own blind spot. There is a tendency to treat the presence of
people with the same foreign background in a city or a country as a distinct
“community”. However the notion of community evokes a sense of shared val-
ues, practices and methods of identifying oneself with the alleged country of
origin, which often runs counter to the real degree of cohesiveness among these
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people. A working infrastructure for one group of citizens like a Chinatown
or Little Italy might seem to prove a shared identity among these citizens in a
foreign and yet homey country. Still, the mere existence of food shops, book-
stores, or even a consulate general doesn’t say much about identities of the peo-
ple termed “members” of the community. This is certainly true for Japanese di-
asporas worldwide which are often supported by a Japanese infrastructure and
are advertised as coherent groups. However, most Japanese have much more
complex strategies for identifying themselves than advertising themself as a per-
sonification of a perfect Japanese; some do at times for various reasons, others
refrain from doing so.
In contrast to this understanding of diaspora we look for performative mo-
ments in which citizens identify themselves as diasporic. A cultural center or a
festival which normally would be seen as an expression of identity of an diasporic
“community” thus turns into a moment in which diaspora and even community
is created –momentarily and dynamic, not as a static assumption about “belong-
ing”. 3/11 certainly was such a moment in which many people worldwide were
emotionally hit by the dramatic situation in Northeast Japan and felt the need
to show their solidarity. Various motives drove these people. A basic human
compassion, a long standing history of personal protest against nuclear power,
personal experience of similar disasters or a sympathy for Japan and the Japanese
might have been reasons for donating, starting relief projects and other ways of
helping. Another strongmotive formany people to engage themselves into relief
projects for North Japan was their Japanese descent and their feeling that they
had to identify with the “country of their origin”. However, in a sense, terminol-
ogy is misleading here and in itself suggests “natural bonds” between Japanese
abroad and Japan. The question of origins only became virulent for some people
because of 3/11 and their feeling that they had to react somehow. Others did not
feel any obligation and thus did not stress origins.
In our volume we look at the effects of 3/11 on diasporas in various places.
First Nico Besnier’s article concentrates on frameworks and concepts for dealing
with diaspora. His theoretical introduction forms the theoretical setting for the
following papers as it challenges the idea of diaporas as tightly knit community.
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Based on this critique we scrutinize reactions to 3/11 and ask about the motives
of the various actors in the unfolding process. Next our volume analyses reac-
tions to two different types of Japanese diasporas as outlined by Harumi Befu
(2001: 12). Japanese diasporas in Düsseldorf, Belgium and London belong to
the rotating type according to Befu. Most Japanese are not permanently in Eu-
rope, they have been dispatched by the companies for a period of three to five
years or are family members of dispatched managers. This group’s ties to Japan
are mostly very strong and absolutely unquestioned, and the 3/11 disaster was
a test for them regarding the relation of the Japanese to their surroundings. Ruth
Martin shows how this led to overwhelmingly positive reactions and feelings in
London. The Japanese living there were successful in organizing meaningful
public events which helped to console the grievance and strengthen ties to non-
Japanese. In contrast the public events of mourning staged in Düsseldorf – the
location of the third largest Japanese diaspora in Europe after London and Paris
– were somewhat unsettling and unfolded their meaning only in the coverage of
the local media but less so for those taking part as Christian Tagsold shows in
his paper. Finally Andreas Niehaus and Tine Walravens present the findings of
their research into the reaction of long-term and short-term Japanese nationals
living in Belgium following the Triple Disaster.
Jutta Teuwsen and Peter Bernardi present findings on two permanent dias-
poras. Teuwsen asks about the meaning of 3/11 for Japanese in Hawaii. Most
Japanese came to the islands about a century ago. The current diaspora is made
up mostly of third-, fourth- and fifth-generation Japanese. For a long time these
Japanese-Americans have avoided identifying themselves by the history of mi-
gration of their (great) grandparents, due to Japan’s aggression in World War II.
However, 3/11 sparked a new trend of identification with Japan. As Bernardi
shows, Japanese in Sao Paolo have never felt the need to disguise their migra-
tional history. After 3/11 various actors have tried, however, to lead the broad
movement of solidarity and channel donations through their organization to
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Diasporas: Communities of Practice, Economies of Affect
Niko Besnier
It is at times of extreme public trauma that concepts like “community”, “identity”
and “cohesion” become the object of sustained attention. At the same time, this
attention tends to be based on a naturalization of the concepts, the assumption
that, on the one hand, these categories do not need to be defined or analyzed and,
on the other hand, that they are morally positive, essentially good and important
goals for all to pursue. What I would like to do in this brief intervention is to
examine some of these assumptions and suggest ways in which we can better
theorize our understanding of social action at times of intense trauma in the
context of transnational dispersal and diverse connections.
Perhaps a fruitful point of departure is an examination of the oft-cited and
seldom questioned concept “identity”. Its genealogy in the social sciences en-
capsulates the complexities and contradictions that are embedded in the very
concept itself. We generally associate the birth of a social scientific understand-
ing of identity with developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst Erik Erik-
son’s pivotal work, Identity and the Life Cycle (Erikson 1959). In this work,
Erikson sought to capture the insight that, while people strive to maintain to
themselves and to others a sense of continuity and growth, they go through life
facing numerous and diverse challenges. As the challenges they face become
more complex and diverse, people’s sense of self increases in complexity. While
Erikson focused primarily on the development of a psychological identity, he
had also been strongly influenced by North American cultural anthropologists
of his time; thus he recognized that persons are embedded in social groups and
stressed that their sense of identity is as much the product of the people around
them as the outcome of intra-personal development. Continuity in the context
of change, person-internal as well as person-external, and the fragile play of di-
vergent forces were integral to the concept of identity since its timid emergence
in our analytic vocabulary, and militates for an approach to identity as a con-
tingent, interactive and unfinished project. It has also motivated some scholars
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to argue that the concept is so fraught with problems (e. g. its instability as an
analytic and experiential category) to completely undermine its usefulness or to
replace it with another, more useful category like subjectivity (Brubaker et al.
2000: 1-47; Ortner 2005: 31-52).
Just as fragile and complex is our notion of “community”, which of course goes
much further in time than “identity”, originating in the social sciences in the vi-
sions of Alexis de Tocqueville, Ferdinand Tönnies and Émile Durkheim (if not
before). It is coming to us via a century’s worth of sociological and anthropolog-
ical thinking and writing, to late twentieth-century reclaimings of community
in some social scientific and philosophical circles, as in the works of Robert Bel-
lah and his colleagues Charles Taylor and Christopher Lasch (Bellah et al. 2007;
Taylor 1989; Lasch 1979). Community and identity bear striking resemblances
to one another; equally unstable, the two concepts are the subject of a great deal
of romanticization of an idealized past in which social cohesion was made un-
problematic by feelings of sameness (cf. both Durkheim and Karl Marx), as well
as an idealized present and future, in which identity politics and the longing for
community reify and fetishize them. Just as community is relentlessly portrayed
as an “unequivocal good, an indicator of a high quality of life, a life of human
understanding, caring, selflessness, belonging”, identity is for many a must and
forms the basis of claims to recognition, pushes for legal protection and personal
feelings of pride and achievement (Joseph 2002: vii).
The relationship between identity and community, on the one hand, and what
they are supposed to oppose, on the other, is fraught. Identity politics, based at
once on the construction of sameness and difference, seeks to rectify past and
present injustices in the formof oppression, denial of rights, andnon-recognition.
However, identity politics is also based on reified notions of authenticity and
romanticized understandings of community. In fact, many invocations of com-
munity in the name of progressive causes and social justice fail to understand the
extent to which they themselves are produced by the very source of inequality
and lack of justice in society, namely capitalism (Against et al.2006: 3-22). Wit-
ness, for example, the extent to which racial, ethnic, sexual, and other forms of
social differentiation that form the basis of a subaltern politics of liberation from
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oppression and marginalization are understood through acts of consumption,
through the discrimination between those who belong and those who fail to be-
long, and through acts of power within the ranks of discriminated groups. Thus,
for example, African-American identity politics in theUnited States (where iden-
tity politics was essentially invented) becomes co-opted by the consumption of
“Afrocentric” products, from textiles to music to names (Stoller 2002; Boateng
2004: 212-226). And nowhere is the importance of “who belongs and who does
not”more strident than in criticisms of the current president of the United States
for not being “black enough” by some and “not American” by others.
Now (as if all this were not complicated enough already), transnational move-
ment creates additional complexities, particularly when thismovement takes the
shape of what we have come to call “diasporic dispersal”. So it is to diasporas that
I now turn. As is well known, the term itself is from Old Testament Greek. It
was originally borrowed into English in the late-nineteenth century. (The Ox-
ford English Dictionary lists a first occurrence in 1876, and it appears in the 1881
edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica under the entry for “Israel”.) For the next
century, the term referred almost exclusively to the successive dispersals of Jews
in the ancient world. It was only in the 1990s that the term entered social scien-
tific language, where it became associated with sociological and anthropological
approaches to people’s mobility that defied a simplistic understanding of migra-
tions as movement from point A to point B, followed by the relative integration
of migrants into the social conditions of point B and their gradual disengage-
ment from the social conditions of point A. At the time, a drive was afoot in
understanding the movement of people not as a matter of “migration”, which
conforms to this simplistic model, but as “mobility” (Hannam et al. 2006: 1-22;
Urry 2007). This considerably more dynamic concept allows for movement be-
tween not just two but multiple points, not only unidirectional movement but
also backtracking and sidestepping, as well as a play of multiple allegiances and
senses of belonging, all of which, if we believe globalization theorists, are new
to the late twentieth century.
Diasporic situations involve all of these features, with a particular emphasis
on a number of characteristics (Brubaker 2005: 1-19). The first and perhaps least
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controversial defining feature of a diaspora is dispersal to multiple destinations.
In contrast to migrant populations following a predictable path determined by
clear historical contingencies (e. g., Algerians moving to France afterWorldWar
II), diasporas consist of people moving to different geographical points. The di-
aspora on which my own work focuses is a good example: since the 1960s, Ton-
gans have moved in relatively large numbers from their island kingdom in the
South Pacific to New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii, and the Continental United
States, as well as, in smaller numbers, to a vast list of destinations, including
Japan, to the extent that very few countries of the world fail to count at least a
small number of Tongans in residence. The effect is one of an “exploded” pop-
ulation, one that moves in the multiple points of the compass from their point of
origin (Besnier 2011; Small 2011; Lee 2003). What plays a determinative role
in the relative multiplicity of destinations are state borders and the legal and
punitive regimes associated with them.
The second feature that characterizes diaspora is what Rogers Brubaker calls
“boundary maintenance”, namely the work that people do to distinguish them-
selves from those who are outside the group and by implication the work that
they do to emphasize commonality and homogeneity within the group. Here,
Brubaker bases himself on Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth’s classic and
yet still profoundly relevant thesis that ethnicity is not the product of the in-
ternal properties of a group (e. g., symbols, physical appearance, practices, ob-
jects) but the product of action designed to distinguish the group from those
outside the group with whom they come into contact (Barth 1969: 9-38). For
Brubaker, diasporic citizens “work” to distinguish themselves from those around
them and do so through various means: endogamy (“marry only someone from
your group”), for example, as well as other forms of self-segregation.
In my own view, this is the weakest factor because it fails to distinguish the
ideology of being different from the social practice of self-differentiation. Take
endogamy in the context of themost canonical diaspora of all, namely the Jewish
diaspora over the centuries. As is well known, formany centuries Jews in Europe
held on to a strong ideology of endogamy and other forms of separation from
mainstream society, and of course mainstream society returned the favor by ex-
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cluding Jews from institutions, spaces and structures of power, or by attempting
to eliminate them. However, in his explosive book, The Invention of the Jewish
People, originally published in Hebrew in 2008, Israeli historian Shlomo Sand
has argued not only that European and Middle Eastern Jews were in constant
and often cordial contact with their non-Jewish neighbors (something that was
certainly the case in the multicultural Ottoman Empire that ruled over the Mid-
dle East for centuries) but also that most modern Jews descend from converts
and inter-marriages (Sand 2009 and Wayland 2004: 405-426). It is only in the
nineteenth century that Jewish intellectuals, inspired by Romantic constructions
of the folk character of German nationalism, began constructing a history of the
Jews as a wandering and separate people who would eventually return to the
Promised Land. (As one can well imagine, the book created an uproar because it
essentially destroys the basis of Zionist claims to land in Israel and Palestine and
everything that stands on it.) For the purpose of our understanding of diasporas,
it modulates the importance of a historically continuous sense of otherness as a
necessary feature of diasporas.
The third and perhaps most interesting feature (as well as more directly rel-
evant to the situation that this special issue focuses on) is a sustained orientation
to the homeland, be it real or imagined. What “orientation” actually means re-
mains vague in many representations. In the example that I have already pro-
vided, that of the Tongan diaspora, as well as many other cases like it, “orien-
tation” is commonly measured or evaluated in terms of material support: for
example, the classic “remittances” or sometimes substantial sums of money that
mobile citizens send to their relatives, their churches or mosques, their villages,
political parties or armies andmilitias (witness the support of the Tamil diaspora
for the Tamil Tigers during the civil war in Sri Lanka) (Wayland 2004: 405-426).
In fact, the motivation for moving in many cases is predominantly the need
and moral responsibility to support non-mobile co-citizens. These feelings of
responsibility are often embedded in long-term structures of reciprocity and in-
debtedness, from the religious responsibility that Buddhism places on Thais to
support their elders to the classic Maussian counter-gift that migrants owe to
their families (or, in darker contexts, to human traffickers) who have financed
17
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their travels. This situation, of course, is much more relevant to diasporas that
emanate from homelands where money is in short supply, employment is lack-
ing, and, even if one finds employment, the income one generates even in high-
level local employment is considerably lower than the income one generates in
low-level employment elsewhere. Thus, Filipino medical doctors find it prefer-
able to work as nurses in Canada (where their medical doctors’ qualifications are
not recognized) than towork as doctors in the Philippines, despite the downward
economicmobility that this decision represents (McElhinny et al. 2009: 93-110).
But there are other ways in which “orientation to a homeland” canmanifest it-
self, and this is what is relevant here. If we replace “orientation” with “allegiance”,
namely the loyalty or commitment of a person to a group or a cause, then we can
begin to encompass a broader range of diasporic situations, including the one fo-
cused in the present work. But, at the same time, allegiance is a slippery notion.
What is the group or cause that I feel allegiance to? When I sent some money
to the Red Crescent to help people who have lost loved ones and property in
the Pakistani floods of 2010, am I expressing allegiance to a group or a cause, or
simply expressing a humanistic sense of empathy for fellow human beings, no
matter where they live, what religions they practice, and what conditions they
live in? But is my act different than the money I sent to the Japanese Red Cross
on March 2011, because of my much greater personal involvement with Japan
than with Pakistan? Furthermore, allegiance can be complex, in that I can feel
deep sorrow and empathy for people whose families and homes were obliterated
by the tsunami, but howdo I feel about the cronyism between state power and in-
dustrial power, colluding to keep Japanese people in the dark as to the real danger
of radiation? Clearly, allegiance must be to something, and that something may
vary greatly from one person to the other, from one group to the other, and from
one moment to the next. That “something” certainly does not mean “country”, a
concept that conflates nation, state, the corporate world, and the kind of identity
that the nihonjinron (“scholarship of Japanese uniqueness”) industry would like
us to believe operates in Japan. What these considerations imply is that feelings
and action are closely bound together, and that people define themselves, define
who they are in the context of a transnational “community”, and by implication
18
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define what a diaspora is, in terms of “affect”, a category that seeks to capture an
essentially psychological phenomenon (otherwise known as “emotion” or “feel-
ing”) while emphasizing the extent to which this phenomenon is the motivation
for action in response to other actions. The close relationship between affect
and action helps us rethinking diasporic communities not so much as classic in-
stances of Durkheimian or Tönniesian “communities”, or even as instances of
“imagined communities” that Benedict Anderson sees at the root of national-
ism, but in terms of what has been termed “communities of practice” since the
1990s, a category thought up by cognitive anthropologists Jean Lave and Etienne
Wenger to refer to a group of people who share a craft or a profession (Anderson
2006; Lave et al. 1991).
This concept has since been extended to refer to assemblages of persons (note
my wording!) who aim for a common purpose and who are bound together by
that purpose. A common purpose can, of course, be ephemeral, although it can
also be a powerful rallying cry in our fragmented and dispersed world.
Common purpose also invokes ways of linking affect to practice that people
recognize among one another. And from this emerges a fourth aspect of diaspo-
ras that Brubaker does not touch on (neither do other diaspora scholars, as far as
I am aware): the fact that different diasporic nodes have a commonality of pur-
pose. As several authors in this special issue document, transnational Japanese
people’s mobilization in response to the triple disaster linked together different
overseas groups via social media, which I suggest can be analyzed as the devel-
opment of a community of practice around affective responses to trauma. This
certainly resonates with my ethnographic experience of how the Tongan dias-
pora operates, namely as a vast network of transnational links that tie together
groups of people living across vast distances, through the multi-directional ex-
change of goods, money, people (grandmothers or small children traveling from
one diasporic node to another), ideas, fashions, and, I suggest, affects. Affect is
thus embedded in a complex andmulti-scalar system inwhich actions have value
in two general senses: materially (“a value”) and ethically (“values”). These two
understandings of valuemay bleed onto one another, as whenmaterial resources
become the expression of ethical stance and vice versa.
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What emerges from this discussion of aspects of diasporas that have rarely
been foregrounded is the central role that affect and the social practices that are
related to affect play in the construction of diasporas as communities of prac-
tice. Thus affect is the link between inner states and social action, and it is in-
herently reflexive. It is through affect and the actions that derive from it that we
become social and political subjects in response to the people around us. This
has motivated some scholars to talk about “economies of affect”, breaking down
the separation between the materiality of economies and the symbolic nature of
emotions, feelings and affects (Zelizer 2013; Narotzky et al. 2014: S4-S16). Cen-
tralizing the importance of affect in understanding diasporas helps us under-
stand how the trauma of disaster, which generates particularly strong affects, is
linked to the way in which people dispersed around the globe understand them-
selves, their relationship to each other and their relationship to what many still
consider their homeland.
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Mourning for Whom andWhy?
3/11 and the Japanese in Düsseldorf, Germany
Christian Tagsold
1 Introduction
The events of March 2011 in Northern Japan were not simply a locally con-
fined disaster but caught the attention of global media immediately. The dis-
aster also crossed regional and national borders in other respects. It did for
example strongly remind Japanese in Germany of their Migrationshintergrund
(immigrant background). This term often used not only in official documents
and speeches but also in newspapers started out as neutral denomination in the
last decade but has gained a somewhat exclusivist undertone since. Television
stations and newspapers were important agents for turning all people of Japa-
nese descent into true witnesses of the disaster by assuming that they must have
known much more about the ongoing situation and had much stronger feelings
of grief because of their background.
Inmy paper, I want to scrutinize the complexweb of assumptions about other-
ness and othering by using the Japanese inDüsseldorf as an example. Düsseldorf
is the hub for Japanese in Germany for various reasons. About one third of Ger-
many’s Japanese live here. As a consequence, the diaspora became a focus of
attention after 3/11 in the quest of media to establish a rapport with true Japa-
nese in order to get the real emotions. Helpful in this respect were institutional
reactions in Düsseldorf on both the German and the Japanese sides. For the
diaspora and citizens of Düsseldorf in general, the city, the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia and other institutions staged public events of mourning that then
were reported by local and state media and transformed into tangible tokens of
the disaster far to the East.
While scrutinizing the interplay between Japanese in Düsseldorf, various in-
stitutions, and different levels ofmedia attention,mypaperwill questionwhether
public events of mourning in this context can become meaningful. I argue that
they stay hollow symbols and do not help to foster understanding between the
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diaspora and other people in moments of deep grief and instead cement feel-
ings of strangeness and alterity; one reason for this is their inherent staging for
the media as well as the shared notion of a fundamental cultural gap between
Japanese and Germans as well as other people living here.
To show that the Japanese diaspora in Düsseldorf is the best field in Germany
to prove my cause and to give more background, I will first take a look on the
national level and how the quest of variousmedia channels to find the archetypi-
cal Japanese in Germany to relate the disaster far away to the world of the reader
or viewer was not bound to Düsseldorf but took place in the whole country. I
will then zoom into the Japanese ethnoscape – as defined by Appadurai (1996) –
in Düsseldorf and show that the mutual othering that took place after 3/11 is
not limited to the disaster, albeit the public events of mourning emphasized this
tendency. I will the look at a few examples of mourning and their treatment in
media. Finally, I will analyze the outcomes of these rituals on a theoretical level.
2 3/11 in Germany
The triple catastrophe of March 2011 in Northern Japan unfolded quickly in the
media worldwide. OnMarch 11, first the news of a massive earthquake in Japan
followed by a tsunami were reported everywhere although the full extent of the
disaster was not immediately understood. Gradually it became clear that the
number of victims would rise to more than ten thousand. During the next days,
the looming nuclear disaster in the nuclear power plants of Fukushima added to
the horror felt even far away. In Germany, it was especially the nuclear aspect
of the triple catastrophe that began to occupy the newspapers and television sta-
tions. The general discussion about the perils of nuclear energy that had cooled
down somewhat two-and-a-half decades after the Chernobyl disaster became
very heated once again and was the main focus of media attention in the weeks
following the initial shock (Russ-Mohl 2012).
Since Chernobyl, politicians had heatedly debated the use of nuclear energy.
A few years earlier, the ruling coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party
had decided to abandon nuclear power within the next decades, a decision can-
celled by the ensuing conservative-liberal government. However, after 3/11 the
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tide turned again, and Chancellor Angela Merkel came under strong pressure to
reinstate the initial decision to end nuclear power.
Within this context, national leading newspapers and television channels, in-
cluding those regionally bound, tried to explain the disaster in general and the
details of the nuclear crisis through explaining its Japanese character, which
meant that Japanese scholars and East Asian specialists were contacted for in-
terviews and expertise. Typical questions were why the Japanese had built nu-
clear power plants in potential danger zones in the first place, why they remained
seemingly calm and untouched even in the midst of this major disaster, and fi-
nally, why they did not flee the danger of becoming contaminated by radiation
immediately. These and similar questions were wrongly based on essentialist
notions of a Japanese national character in the first place and thus hard to an-
swer quickly. Answers would become much more complex than most of the
journalists wanted them to be.
Many stories of media contacts have been discussed intensively between East
Asian specialists in Germany. Within a group of people of themailing list of East
Asian scholars, a heated debate evolved around the story of an interview request
by Der Spiegel, the leading German weekly political journal, with many of the
involved taking sides. The general consensus was that most reporters looked for
answers that would portrait Japanese as stoic samurais dealing heroically with a
natural disaster.
The media sought out to interview Japanese living in Germany in order to
lend a human face to news coverage and if possible to gain additional insights
into what the ongoing disaster meant for Japanese. Since there are about 30,000
Japanese living in Germany, it was not too difficult to find enough willing in-
terview partners to fill the void. Yet media stations sometimes wanted more
than simply interviews and looked for footage with a specific Japanese touch.
A colleague in Munich reported being contacted by the Bavarian State Televi-
sion, which sought to take pictures of Japanese living in the region mourning
at a local Buddhist temple. However, only a few hundred Japanese live in the
region even though Bavaria is the economic powerhouse of Germany and Mu-
nich the third-largest city of the country. My colleague had to tell the producer
25
Christian Tagsold
of the program that no Buddhist temple exists for this small diaspora and that
even if there was a temple, it would be highly unlikely that any Japanese would
mourn there. In contrast to the assumption of the producer, not all members
of the Japanese diaspora are Buddhist. Even if they were Buddhist, many would
see no need to mourn at a Buddhist temple but would rather inform themselves
about the ongoing disaster on television.
Many journalists thus attempted to generalize and stereotype the Japanese. In
the midst of a quickly unfolding massive-scale disaster, it was on the one hand
surely tempting to look for quick answers and on the other simply impossible to
fully grasp the complex background. Some journalists tried to do so. I personally
was contacted by someone who was quite relieved to learn that most depictions
of the Japanese were just based on stereotypes. Yet the overall impression of the
Japanese, regardless of whether they lived in Japan or in Germany or anywhere
else in the world, was that they are highly homogenous and very different than
Germans. This othering throughmedia coverage gained credibility because offi-
cial Japanese institutions in Germany largely backed these arguments. The dis-
course of othering finds its counterpart in the so-called nihonjinron, the theories
of “Japanese-ness” in Japan that are upheld officially by Japan andmany Japanese
because nihonjinron publications are pervasive on the Japanese market.
3 Ideal Foreigners
All in all, the Düsseldorf area drew themost attention from thesemedia attempts
because of the many Japanese living there and the established Japanese infras-
tructure. While other cities like Berlin, Hamburg and especially Frankfurt also
have smaller Japanese diasporas, the one in Düsseldorf is the largest and by far
the best established and best known in Germany (Glebe 2004; Tagsold 2010).
Düsseldorf prides itself on hosting Little Tokyo, a stretch of Japanese bookstores,
food shops and hotels near the main station.
In early March 2011, pundit Henryk M. Broder compared the Japanese com-
munity in Düsseldorf to Turkish migrants in Germany in his op-ed published in
the conservative newspaper Die Welt. Broder is a very well-known albeit some-
what controversial author. His criticism of Islamic migrants and their commu-
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nities is often harsh. However, the op-ed mirrors the official attitude very well
and probably the attitude of many citizens in Düsseldorf as well. The Japanese,
according to Broder, resemble the Turkishmigrants in one regard: both commu-
nities form “parallel-societies”. This term was coined in the German discussion
onmigration and integration during the 1990s (Ronneberger 2009; Yildiz 2009).
Conservative and liberal politicians havemostly used the term to criticize the un-
willingness of migrants to integrate and thus legitimate state programs designed
to govern these migrants’ assimilation into German society. Broder (2011) ar-
gues that the Japanese parallel-society causes no social problems in stark contrast
to the Turkish and asks rhetorically:
Is it because no Japanese has taken legal action to fight for a prayer room in
school? Or because no Japanese has refused to arrange beverages in a super-
market because his religion does not allow him to drink them? Or because
Japanese are under-represented as serious offenders but over-represented for
high-school diplomas?
Broder’s argumentsmirror the approach of Düsseldorf ’s public relations strategy
to present the Japanese as “ideal foreigners” as I have argued elsewhere (Tagsold
2010). The city prides itself on the Japanese community – not only on its home-
page but also in many other contexts. Although the roughly 6,300 Japanese in
Düsseldorf (Jäschke 2008) are a minor group among the more than 130,000 cit-
izens with a foreign passport, they receive by far the most attention. Broder’s
arguments are widely shared by the city. The Japanese are ideal foreigners who
demand no rights and ”integrate” with nearly no effort expended by the city. In-
stead official Japanese institutions regularly help to stage events that are ideally
suited for the city’s marketing strategies because of their exoticism. The biggest
of these events is Japan Day, which is celebrated each year in late spring and
brings nearly one million visitors to the city.
Broder’s op-ed is marred by erratic assumptions. His essentializing approach,
which treats the Japanese and Turks as completely homogenous groups, is a bla-
tant misrepresentation of the complex realities of immigration issues in Ger-
many. Additionally, Broder must completely ignore the composition of the two
groups in Germany in order to draw his highly polemical conclusions. While
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many Turks suffer from racism and social exclusion and are pushed system-
atically into low-paid jobs or dependence on social welfare, many Japanese in
Düsseldorf work for Japanese companies in extremely well-paid white-collar
jobs or are family members. In addition, the majority of Japanese reside in Ger-
many on a fixed-term basis and will return to Japan after a few years. Thus,
integration and fight for civil rights is by far not as problematic as in the Turk-
ish case. The Japanese diaspora indeed seems to live a quiet life without major
troubles in Düsseldorf, just like Broder suggested in March 2011. This refers to
the image drawn by Düsseldorf ’s marketing. In showcasing the Japanese, the
much larger communities of Turks, Greeks and Italians get less attention, and
their demands and needs often compare unfavorably to those of the Japanese.
However, themakeup of the Japanese diaspora inDüsseldorf has been shifting
in the last two decades. While rotating white collar workers and their families
were indeed the overwhelming majority twenty years ago, lately more Japanese
tend to stay for more than the three-year period, which is the typical length of a
company assignment abroad (Tagsold 2010: 149). The number of Japanese who
have attained the right to an unlimited stay in Germany is a clear indication of
this. In 2010, more than 2,500 Japanese had attained this status (Gaimusho ryōji
seisakuka 2010: 50), which currently is granted after five years of residence. In
addition, some do not intend to return to Japan and thus have different needs
regarding their surroundings compared to the white-collar strata. This shift is
not reflected in most of the official dealings with Japanese in Düsseldorf, and the
local media still presents the Japanese as temporary guests in the city and not as
full citizens. The aftermath of 3/11 in Düsseldorf gives ample evidence of this
understanding.
4 Staging Solidarity
ManyNGOs and other types of groups planned events inDüsseldorf in theweeks
following the triple disaster. Most of them were organized to raise money for
the survivors in North Japan. The Japan Club, which is the main organization of
Japanese in Düsseldorf, performed at the main station and held concerts and ex-
hibitions as charity events. Newly formed groups joined well-established NGOs
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in the efforts to collect money and show solidarity with the victims and survivors
of the triple disaster. However, because these events were small and scattered,
they mostly attracted only limited attention.
Three public events stood out inDüsseldorf because of their size and the atten-
tion they got both through attendance and coverage in local media. Two events
took place on Saturday ten days after the triple disaster: the memorial service at
the local Buddhist temple and the candlelight vigil in the center of the city. The
official state memorial service was held a week later on Sunday in a peripheral
park. They were all staged as public mourning events open to everyone. They
did not involve substantial fund raising but were meant as tokens of solidarity
with the victims and survivors in North Japan. The three events assembled a few
hundred participants each. Because of attendance and media coverage, these
three public events serve best to analyze the most salient problems of the public
reaction in Düsseldorf to the tragedy in Northern Japan.
The first of the events was the commemoration service at the Buddhist temple.
Roughly 250 people assembled there. The temple is a central institution repre-
senting Japan in Düsseldorf. It belongs to one of the main Buddhist schools of
Japan. Even though the majority of Japanese in Düsseldorf are not members of
these schools, the temple acts as a hub for many of them through its cultural
events and its kindergarten. Furthermore, it is deeply entangled with the Japa-
nese consulate general.
During the memorial service, the leading Buddhist priest not only performed
various sermons and rituals but also read recollections of victims of the catastro-
phe and thereby gave a voice to those who sufferedmost. Except for the chanting
of sutras, most of the ceremony was conducted in German. The attendance was
mainly German. Only a few dozen Japanese were present – a rather unusual
ratio of participants for the temple, which normally attracts more Japanese than
Germans to its events. In contrast to the low Japanese attendance, media was
very present at the service. Three television teams, two belonging to national
state stations and one to a local private channel, actively moved around to get
good footage. In addition, newspaper journalists from local newspapers waited
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in front of the temple to interview participants. Media representatives made up
more than 10 percent of the attendees.
The candlelight vigil on the evening of the same day in the center of the city
was also a focus for the media. However, journalists only took pictures during
the firstminutes and conducted short interviewswith the organizers before rush-
ing back to their editorial departments. Two high-school students had organized
this commemoration in order to offer a chance to citizens of Düsseldorf to ex-
press their grief in a non-political context, as they toldme in an interview. About
500 people followed the call to line up while holding candles in their hands. The
mode of the commemoration was a little bit odd because candlelight demon-
strations usually are a form of protest against right-wing violence against immi-
grants that sprang up in the 1990s. Participants whom I interviewed partly had a
background of such protests and even had brought along their candles from the
old days. Other participants strongly sided with organizer’s point of holding an
apolitical commemoration.
Finally, the official commemoration event of the state of North Rhine-West-
phalia took place one week later. The president of state opened the event with
her speech followed by themayor of Düsseldorf and the Japanese consul general.
In addition, the priest of the aforementioned Buddhist temple again conducted
a Buddhist ceremony. At the end of the event, a Catholic and a Protestant priest
read a joint Christian message before the Buddhist priest struck the bell of the
Buddhist temple to conclude the event. In stark contrast to the other two events,
a few hundred Japanese took part this time, nearly outnumberingGerman atten-
dance. The Japanesemostly attended in blackmourning suits while theGermans
were dressed in usual Sunday afternoon dress. This commemoration had some
political undertones. The official speakers at the state memorial service subtly
interpreted the events through their lens – the conservative mayor of Düsseldorf
tried to avoid the topic of Fukushima while the left-wing state president made
it the main topic of her speech.
The event had another unsettling layer of meaning. Typically at such events
in Germany not only political leaders express their grief and solidarity but also
religious leaders are invited to console participants. Thus, a Buddhist priest, a
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Catholic priests and a Protestant pastor took part and conducted religious cer-
emonies. Nevertheless, the Buddhist ceremony did obviously puzzle German
participants. The Buddhist priest conducted his part standing with his back to
participants and chanting mostly sutras. No explanation accompanied his ac-
tions. Most Japanese closed their eyes and took an appropriate pose, but many
Germans looked around bewildered. In contrast, the Catholic and Protestant
representatives spoke to the crowd explaining their religious interpretation of
the catastrophe.
However, local media coverage created new interpretations contradicting the
impressions from the spot. According to the local press, the Buddhist ceremony
at the temple and even the candlelight vigil seemed to be deeply Japanese expres-
sions of grief. Both public events were depicted and described as being domi-
nated by Japanese participants. This contrasted with the real attendance at the
events. For example, the leading local newspaper on the next day depicted the
few Japanese at the candlelight vigil in about half the pictures on their home-
page coverage of the events. In contrast, local media only cursorily mentioned
the state commemoration one week later and even less so the many hundred
Japanese present there.
A reason for this type of local media coverage surely can be explained by the
visual qualities of the public events. The Buddhist temple and the candlelight
vigil lend themselves perfectly for stunning photos. In addition, both settings
allowed for instant othering by highlighting the Japanese attendance. This not
only made the events more exotic but also legitimized them as authentic expres-
sions of those affectedmost by the triple catastrophe. The official state commem-
oration had no such qualities. Most Japanese attended in black suits that were
apt to express their feelings but not very exotic.
However, it would be too easy to speak of medial misrepresentation through
media coverage in the case of the memorial events. All three public events were
not simply staged for those attending but had been organized with local media
coverage in mind. The state commemoration offered a platform for cameras and
journalists, which even hindered the crowd to see the stage fully. At the Buddhist
temple, media had been given full access and had been allowed to park their vans
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on the grounds next to the temple itself. Finally, the pupils organizing the can-
dlelight vigil had learned their lessons quickly and were freely giving interviews
to the journalists. Thus, media was part of the commemoration from the very
outset in all three cases.
5 Empty Rituals
OnceCliffordGeertz (1973: 448) askedwhat people “tell themselves about them-
selves” in rituals. I have deliberately avoided the term “ritual” for the three cases
and instead used Don Handelman’s (1998) alternative “public events”. But set-
ting this differentiation aside, which I will take up again in a moment, Geertz’s
questions clearly needs a much more complex answer in the case of Düsseldorf.
The public events are not set in one cultural set but at least two – the Japanese one
and that of Düsseldorf itself. As a consequence it is not so clear who “themselves”
denotes. In addition, these events did not simply gain meaning through being
staged on the spot and only for those being present. In contrast, local media cov-
erage lent them a deeper meaning, thus broadening the notion of “themselves”
in yet another dimension. As a consequence, the commemoration of the catas-
trophe in Düsseldorf was extremely multilayered andmultifaceted. What is true
for Düsseldorf also holds true for Germany in general as the examples in chapter
2 prove; however, each and every public event did not expand its meaning along
the lines I will analyze now.
Handelman (1998) has divided public events into two types. One type of these
events mirrors, the other models. Handelman, thereby, was able to analyze what
anthropologists have defined as rituals in a new way. Some public events change
the world through modeling them. They ingrain a new vision of the world in
their design and apply it to this very lived-in world. Other public events sim-
ply reflect what is out there already and amplify it. Bureaucracies in modern
states are often the sponsors of public events as mirrors. They propagate their
taxonomies through staging them. But mirrors are not only set up by the state
or institutions belonging to it. Many events in the modern world are ruled by
official taxonomies.
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Handelman helps to understand the three public events in Düsseldorf and the
role media did play. The case seems most clear for the state commemoration, in
which bureaucracy seemed to control the event and its outcomes fully. The value
of international solidarity was staged by the state of NRW, the city of Düsseldorf,
and the Japanese consulate general. In doing so, a clear divide between Germans
and Japanese was confirmed – the former showing their solidarity with the latter
but not overcoming what separates both groups. In that sense, the public event
acted as a reinforcement of the notion of parallel societies.
The other two events were less designed to differentiate between Japanese and
non-Japanese. They addressed both groups equally. Especially the candlelight
vigil seemed to work on a strong symbolic unification of all citizens. However,
nearly no Japanese attended because the symbolism of the event probably was
lost to them. They had not experienced the huge candlelight vigils two decades
earlier that did foster simultaneously a strongmood of integration andmulticul-
turalism. The organizers had not been able to convey this to the Japanese living
in Düsseldorf.
Local media worked against the possibility of integration through shared
mourning. By singling out the Japanese for sake of making pictures of the event
more exotic, the newspapers fed the trend of othering again. The design of the
candlelight vigil helped them strongly to achieve this effect. The same was true
for thewhole setting of the Buddhist temple. In contrast, the official statemourn-
ing did not offer many exotic impressions but the usual political staging. In ad-
dition, it came too late to leave much of an impression in the media even though
it had the largest group of Japanese of all events and also the most prominent
mourners.
Handelman (1998: XXXVIII) has pointed out that a strong emphasis of visual
qualities is a typical trait for public events that mirror. This is very much true
for the two events at the Buddhist temple and the candlelight vigil. They did
answer many questions through visualizing solidarity explicitly and otherness
and exoticism implicitly. Local media coverage amplified these visual qualities
in both cases. The mourning at the Buddhist temple even made it into national
prime time news, but the few seconds shownonTVwere onlymeant as a glimpse
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into exotic Japan in Germany. The colorful and somewhat mystical atmosphere
of the temple added to the overall strangeness of the ongoing crisis in Japan after
3/11.
6 Conclusion
On March 11, 2012, many remembered the horrible triple catastrophe. The nu-
clear wreckage of Fukushima clearly was the focus of most of themedia coverage
because this part of the catastrophe has not yet been resolved and will not be for
many decades. In contrast, the misery that the earthquake and most of all the
tsunami had inflicted on people in Northern Japan was, if not forgotten, at least
much less the focus of public memory in Germany.
What is somehow telling is that the public events of 2011 that were meant to
prove solidarity with Japan had evaded the public memory. They had left nearly
no imprint on the quality of relations between the Japanese in Düsseldorf and
other citizens. Neither the Internet forum Dusselnet, which gathers voices from
Japanese in Düsseldorf, nor the consulate general, during their year-end party
celebrating the birthday of the emperor, mention any of these events. The atten-
tion of the consulate general had shifted to display Japan in general and specifi-
cally Northern Japan as healthy overall with much to offer for export. Reestab-
lishing economical viable export relations was paramount at the end of 2011 at
the consulates general party.
This is yet another proof of how empty signs of solidarity were in shaping the
image of Japanese living in Düsseldorf. After all, the events were important for
momentarily adding a local touch to world news but not important in their own
right. This is a conclusion that certainly holds true for Japanese in Germany
in general. These Japanese did not gain a heightened interest and even less so
were seen as members of a diaspora. In contrast, public events after 3/11 and
especially their representation in local media othered Japanese living in Düssel-
dorf. Instead of turning them into co-citizens, they idealized Japan.
On the personal level, some stories of the Japanese reflect the problems of the
public events and their representations while others point in a different direc-
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tion. One writer on Dusselnet complained in her entry that she felt as though
Germans scolded her, for example, in the supermarket, for the nuclear catas-
trophe of Fukushima. As a Japanese, she was made responsible in her eyes for
a misguided nuclear policy with too low standards of security. However, other
Japanese reported that neighbors and friends tried to console them and offered
help.
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“Even if it is Just a Little Help
for the Victims from the Distant Belgium”:
Japanese Nationals in Belgium and the 3/11 Triple Disaster
Andreas Niehaus and Tine Walravens
1 Introduction
Anthropologists have argued that disasters “mobilize forces of cultural change”
and that the potential fields of studies vary because disasters affect every aspect
of human life, be it social, economic, environmental, political or even biological
(Hoffman et al. 2002: 3–22). The theoretical approaches on disaster, however,
take as their subject of studymembers of societies and cultures whowere directly
struck by disaster and limit their research spatially to the inflicted areas. Never-
theless, members of a given diaspora will also be deeply affected by catastrophe
in their homeland. Rogers Brubaker (2005: 12) remarks that “as a category of
practice, ‘diaspora’ is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate
expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties”. It is, we will argue, in
times of crisis and trauma that these practices construct, increase and intensify
an awareness of community and evoke certain reactions generated by emotions,
feelings and affects. When Japan was struck by the 3/11 Triple Disaster in 2011,
Japanese nationals living in Belgium took a diasporic stance and immediately
showed their commitment and loyalty by organizing charity events and moral
support activities.1 Edith Turner (2012: 76) coined the term “communitas of
1 Figures obtained from the Japanese Embassy in Brussels show that all the overseas establishments
of Japan (meaning, for example, all embassies and consulates, JETRO offices abroad) received
J¥ 8.9 billion (= € 88.5 million) as of February 2012. The total amount which the Belgian Red
Cross transferred to its Japanese counterparts is € 1,061,129 or J¥ 116,563,464 of which € 666,129
was from the Flemish Red Cross and € 395,000 from the Croix-Rouge de Belgique, Communauté
francophone. Of that total amount, € 22,000 came from gifts received by the Japanese Embassy in
Belgium and € 315,000 from gifts received by the BJA, the Belgium-Japan Association and Cham-
ber of Commerce. These figures do not include donations and money from support actions orga-
nized by the Belgian community in Japan, nor donations transferred directly to the Japanese Red
Cross or other organizations in Japan. Moreover, it seemed impossible to analyse what percentage
of this money that has been donated by Belgians, Japanese individuals or companies in Belgium.
See also Interview 1, May 22, 2012.
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disaster” in order to describe the feeling of togetherness that will result from a
shared experience of a trauma. The parameter “shared experience”, however,
can be applied to different groups, creating different communitas as well as de-
grees of “sharedness” and separation. With regard to the Tōhoku Triple Disaster,
“shared experience” firstly refers to the direct victims in Tōhoku and secondly to
their families not living in the affected areas.2 However, “shared experience”
can also refer to the idea of the Japanese nation, in contrast to other nations
that were spared from the catastrophe. A further level of sharedness existed be-
tween the Japanese nationals living abroad at the time of the disaster and the
Japanese nationals living in the home country. Although the group of Japanese
living abroad long term or permanently still are and still feel Japanese, they will
often be considered not Japanese “enough” by the Japanese living in Japan and
by that denied “ownership” of the catastrophe. The disaster that struck Northern
Japan thus creates a complex field where questions of identity, identification and
belonging are tested and negotiated.
The disaster created diasporic communities that gave gifts with the purpose of
supporting the homeland both materially and morally. Niko Besnier, referring
to Joel Robbins, argues that these gifts also strengthen allegiance to the home-
land: “intrinsic to giving and accepting is the mutual recognition of the other
party, and thus the basis of self-conscious selfhood, which places the gift right
at the center of a moral order. Remittances, then, bind the participants in a
common moral order of mutual recognition. And so do that particular kind of
remittances, gifts provided to help relief efforts in the wake of disaster” (Besnier
2009: 71–80). By linking remittances with the “crisis of return”, we could ar-
gue that gift-giving will serve to show the solidarity of an individual as well as
a group with the homeland, thus strengthening the feeling of belonging on both
sides and securing a smooth return to the homeland for the short-term expatri-
ates. In this context, we should also mention that donating and showing support
manifested as a practice of communality; thus, it also created a sense of belonging
(or exclusion) within the group of Japanese nationals living in Belgium.
2 The different levels of shared experience also applies to direct victims of Tōhoku because somewill
have lost family members or friends, while others will “only” have lost their property or material
possessions.
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Based on fifteen in-depth interviews with Japanese nationals living in Bel-
gium conducted between March and December 2012,3 this article will analyze
how far their response as a social practice differed in relation to their residen-
tial status and to what extent they negotiated questions of identity, communality
and group consciousness by engaging in support projects. Diasporic commu-
nities can generally be divided into short-term and long-term residents. For this
study, we chose Brussels (the capital of Belgium) and Ghent (in the Flemish re-
gion) because the Japanese diasporic population in the former is characterized
by a large number of short-term rotating individuals with a low degree of inte-
gration, while the Japanese nationals living in the latter are mainly permanent
residents that are generally well integrated into the host community. In Ghent,
we interviewed one short-term and five long-term Japanese residents. In Brus-
sels, we conducted a total of nine interviews, seven of which were with Japa-
nese short-term residents in Brussels. Additionally, we also interviewed a Japa-
nese official at the Embassy of Japan and a Belgian representative of the Belgium
Japan Association (BJA) Chamber of Commerce. We based our main approach
on the assumption that diasporic communities are indeed characterized by prac-
tice. However, before focusing on howpractice (re)created community following
the triple disaster, it is necessary to map the ethnoscape of Japanese nationals in
Belgium, based on the available official statistical data as well as the community’s
infrastructure.
2 Mapping the Ethnoscape of Japanese Nationals in Belgium
The Kingdom of Belgium, with a population of 9,832,010 (in 2011), is divided
into three parts. The division is based on language, which, amongst other issues,
fuels political and social conflict. Belgium has three official languages: Dutch,
French and German. TheDutch speaking community is situated in the econom-
ically strong northern region of Flanders and the French speaking population in
the Southern region ofWallonia. A minority of German-speaking Belgians lives
3 The interviews focused on questions concerning personal life, daily habits, interpersonal relations
and network dynamics, organization of and participation in charity events, impact of the disaster
on identity and feelings of belonging, media coverage.
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in the Eastern part ofWallonia. According to themost recent statistical data pro-
vided by the EUROSTAT population census, a total of 4,458 Japanese nationals
were living in Belgium on January 1, 2011, of which 2,020 were male and 2,438
female.⁴
Themajority of Japanese nationals who come to Belgium do so for remunera-
tive reasons or family reunification with a Japanese national and will only stay
short-term.⁵ However, Belgium also has a registered group of 901 long-term
residents with Japanese nationality.⁶ Over the last three years, the number of Ja-
panese nationals living in Belgium decreased due to the growing economic crisis
facing Japan, whichmeant that companies reduced their overseas staffmembers,
closed overseas offices or decided not to open new offices. The data received
from the statistics show the Japanese expatriates in Belgium as comparable with
other communities in Europe, for example, in Germany and the Netherlands.
On the one hand, there are rotating, short-term residents of Japanese, primarily
male, employees and their families working for transnational companies or for
governmental institutions and whose residence is concentrated in urban centers
such as Düsseldorf and Amsterdam. On the other hand, we find a primarily fe-
male group of long-term residents married to Belgians.⁷ Although its members
⁴ According to ADSEI (2012), there was a total population of 4,458 Japanese in 2011. As of January
1, 2010, a total of 4,543 Japanese were registered in Belgium. For 2010, see also ADSE (2011).
⁵ The first permits issued for family reasons and remunerative reasons are interrelated; from a total
of 512 first permits for family reasons, 373 were issued on the basis of “person joining a non-EU
citizen”. In these cases, Japanese employees are joined by spouses, partners and children. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that the number of first permits for persons joining an EU-citizen
more than doubled between 2010 (58) and 2011 (139), whereas the persons joining non-EU cit-
izens decreased in absolute numbers from 412 in 2010. See Eurostat; Centrum voor gelijkheid
van kansen en voor racismebestrijding (2011). First permits issued for remunerative activities ac-
counted for 334 permits in 2011, with the majority issued for a period less than a year (303). Only
62 permits were issued for educational purposes, of which 58 were for studies, and 54 received
a permit for less than a year Eurostat (2012). The number of Japanese students coming to Belgium
dropped from 91 in 2008 to 58 in 2011.
⁶ In 2011, a total 901 Japanese citizens were registered as long-term residents in Belgium of which
72.6 percent (655) were female; (Eurostat).
⁷ When gender is taken into consideration, it shows that the first permit visa for remunerative ac-
tivities in 2011 were mainly issued to male Japanese, accounting for 89.4 percent (262), with only
31 permits issued to female Japanese. As can be expected, the ratio is reversed in the case of
first permits for family reasons (Eurostat). See also Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor
racismebestrijding (2012).
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are primarily middle-class and residing in Belgium due to corporate rotation,
the transient community in Belgium is quite diverse and will, as became evident
from the interviews, generate formal and informal, mobile subgroups, based on
occupation (company), place of residence, age of the children, gender or leisure
interests.⁸
The highest concentration of Japanese citizens (2,987 in 2011) can be found
in the county of Brussels.⁹ As Brussels is the capital of Belgium, home to the
NATO headquarter and primary seat of the EU, it attracts a great number of
Japanese companies and lobby organizations.1⁰ It also houses Japanese govern-
mental and semi-governmental organizations, including the Japanese Embassy
to the Kingdom of Belgium, The Mission of Japan to the EU, EU-Japan Centre
for Industrial Cooperation, Japan External Trade Organization Office (JETRO)
and the Belgium-Japan Association and Chamber of Commerce (BJA, founded
in 1991). Brussels houses a large international corporate and political expatriate
community, whose members are well paid. They live in the more exclusive parts
of the city and their social contacts often stay within the limits of this interna-
tional expatriate community. Also, the Japanese living in Brussels as rotating,
short-term residents are not well integrated into the host city but constitute a
parallel society. However, the Japanese residents receive little to no attention
from the host country. It seems that there is no direct need for the Japanese
to integrate into Brussels’ society.11 Brussels is actually situated in the Flemish
part of the country but is mainly French speaking. Within the circles of the in-
ternational corporate and diplomat community of Brussels, English and French
⁸ This pattern can also be observed in other European cities with a high concentration of Japanese,
rotating short-term residents. See White (2003) and Befu (2001).
⁹ Reflecting the economical significance of the counties, 1,230 Japanese citizens live in Flanders
(excluding Brussels) and 240 in Wallonia. See ADSEI (2011). The concentration of 3129 (2010)
Japanese citizens living in Brussels makes the economic disparity even more significant when we
take into consideration that 551 Japanese nationals are living in the province of Flemish-Brabant,
which surrounds Brussels, and in the neighboring province ofWalloon Brabant (91), which results
in a percentage of 81.4 percent Japanese nationals living in the close vicinity of the capital.
1⁰ According to the Belgium-Japan Association, Chamber of Commerce (2011: editorial), there are
about 220 Japanese companies registered in Belgium. Of these companies, 60 percent are situated
in the county of Brussels; Interview 9, June 4, 2012.
11 This has also been argued by Christian Tagsold (2011: 160).
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are the languages most commonly spoken, whereas Dutch plays no significant
role. Accordingly, there is no practical reason for short-term Japanese residents
to learn Dutch.12
It is generally agreed upon that short-term residents tend to reside in close
proximity to each other, thus creating a sense of home in the host country. This
is also true for the Japanese in the county of Brussels, where the majority of Ja-
panese nationals in Belgium reside. When taking a look at the statistical data
available concerning the Japanese population in Brussels, we see that in 2011 a
total of 2,987 Japanese nationals were living in this county. Among those living
in the county of Brussels, 1,991 Japanese residents are concentrated in only three
municipalities from a total of nineteen municipalities in the county; these three
municipalities are St. Lambrechts Woluwe, St. Pieters Woluwe and Oudergem
(ADSEI 2011). If these data are cross-referenced with the prices of the real estate
market in Brussels, we see that St. Lambrechts Woluwe and St. Pieters Woluwe
have the highest rent for apartments in Brussels and that prices in Oudergem
are also generally above average. Members of short-term rotating diasporas are
aware of the fact that they will only stay temporarily in the host country and are
thus less inclined to socialize with members of the host country or to adapt their
life style. As Katarzyna Cwiertka argues concerning short-term employees in the
Netherlands:
The “employees” follow the logistic decisions of their employers with little in-
fluence on their destinations. This, along with the temporary character of their
residence, is the most important factor responsible for the formation of sus-
picious feelings towards foreign culture and a tendency to recreate a Japanese
lifestyle outside Japan in order to leave their identity as untouched as possible.
(Cwiertka 2002: 148)
However,MerryWhite also convincingly linked the creation andmaintenance of
a “Japanese” environment to the question of return, ascertaining that a Japanese
life-style will make the re-entry into the Japanese culture easier: “Re-entry raises
12 However, even within the circles of highly integrated, long-term Japanese residents living in the
Flemish province, English is generally the lingua franca because the partners often do not speak
Japanese; Interview 12, December 10, 2012.
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questions of identity that can be silenced only by strict conformity and virtual
denial of the foreign experience.” (White 1992: 106)13
Japanese short-term residents therefore create a sort of cultural island, an “ecol-
ogy” that mimics the homeland, where members of the community can live a
life according to their standards, needs and interests.1⁴ Furthermore, the hier-
archical group structures and social activities of the homeland are transferred
and practiced in Belgium. The infrastructure in Brussels, mainly maintained by
long-term Japanese residents, includes Japanese supermarkets, Japanese restau-
rants, Japanese recreational clubs, a Buddhist temple, a bulletin (Petits Pois, Jap.
Puchi-Powa) and the Nihonjinkai (Association of the Japanese), a purely Japa-
nese organization that promotes exchange between Belgium and Japan and sup-
ports the Japanese School of Brussels (JSB), which it founded in 1973.1⁵ This
private Japanese school provides an education that conforms to the Japanese
educational system on weekdays and includes Japanese language education on
Saturdaymorning (hoshūkō).1⁶ We see that mostly children from the short-term
community attend the Japanese curriculum onweekdays, while Japanese staying
permanently tend to enroll their children in the Belgian educational system and
additionally send them to the Japanese school on Saturday mornings if they live
in Brussels or the vicinity.
Because Japanese long-term residents in Brussels are often involved in pro-
viding logistic support and knowledge to short-term residents or work for Japa-
nese companies, there is interaction between the two groups on the professional
13 Interviewed short-term resident from Brussels commented on the decreasing numbers of applica-
tions from Japanese teachers wanting to go abroad. The interviewee gave the following reasons:
low income, missing the development in Japan, and easier life in Japan; Interview 15, October 24,
2012.
1⁴ The term “ecology” here refers to an infrastructure providing stability, providing a “home abroad”,
a parallel society, a foreign community that produced its own environmental bubble (Tagsold 2011:
147).
1⁵ The bulletin, or information sheet (jōhō-shi), Petits Poiswas first issued in 1992 by Japanese house-
wives and since 1993 has been registered as an association without lucrative purpose. Today, it
is published at the beginning of every month (with the exception of August), eleven times per
year and has a circulation of 2,000. Furthermore, fundraising and support events are advertised
through this bulletin.
1⁶ The school has about 350 primary and junior high students (Japanese School of Brussels).
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level. However, the social worlds and private networks of both groups remain
separated, as one interviewed short-term male resident in Brussels also stated.1⁷
Belgium is a rather small country, approximately 30,500km2; however the Ja-
panese nationals living outside the direct vicinity of Brussels, such as the Japa-
nese inGhent, have hardly any contact with the Japanese nationals living in Brus-
sels, Japanese organizations or even cultural activities that can be found in the
capital. This is also true for the Japanese living in the city of Ghent. Ghent has a
population of approximately 250,000; the city is situated in the Flemish region
about 50 kilometers northwest of Brussels. The number of Japanese nationals
registered in Ghent on December 31, 2011 was 62 (Gent City 2012: 66). Against
the general overall trend seen in Belgium, the number of Japanese residing in
Ghent is actually increasing. The Japanese expatriates inGhent are dominated by
female Japanese who are married to Belgian nationals. Most of those women are
working outside of the household, in contrast to the professional housewife of the
short-term Japanese community. Through their partners as well as their work
environment, they are generally well integrated into the Flemish community, al-
though the interviews suggest that social contacts aremainly with other Japanese
or expatriates from other nations. Ghent also lacks the infrastructure for main-
taining a Japanese lifestyle, including supermarkets to obtain ingredients for Ja-
panese meals. There are a number of Japanese restaurants located in Ghent, but
they depend on non-Japanese customers and are owned by non-Japanese who
cash in on the recent sushi hype.
The children of the Japanese long-term residents living in Ghent are enrolled
in the Belgian school system and on Saturdays additionally attend the Japanese
school in Lille or, to a lesser degree, the Japanese school of/in Brussels. The
choice for Lille, which is located just across the border to France, is firstly eco-
nomically motivated, because the fees there are considerably lower. A second
factor in Lille’s popularity that was put forward by one of the interviewees is the
“Japaneseness” of the school in Brussels:
Their [school in Lille] target is primarily half-blood children. But, that is my
opinion, the quality of education in Brussels is also very good, but they try to
1⁷ Interview 15, October 24, 2012.
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do everything as it is done in Japan. The school in Lille is more for children that
have another language [than Japanese] as mother tongue.1⁸
Whereas the short-term residents choose an education based on the Japanese
system in order to make the reintegration of their children into the Japanese
school system easier, “doing it the Japanese way” is considered to be a disadvan-
tage for the children of long-term residents because they are used to the Belgian
system and will not need to adapt to the Japanese school system in the future.
In summary, we have observed that there are differences between short-term
and long-term Japanese residents living in Belgium that range from life style,
housing, schooling of children to social life and integration into the host coun-
try. In the following chapters, we will show that the aforementioned differences
are parameters that have an influence on creating communality, belonging and
identity through the practice of supporting the homeland.
3 Supporting Home: Practicing Diaspora in Brussels and Ghent
3.1 Institutionalized Support: Japanese Short-Term Residents in Brussels
Examining the fundraising events and support activities from the rotating short-
term community in Brussels, we see that the short-term residents have a low level
of participation in the events organized outside the community and in the orga-
nization of support actions. If there were actions organized by the short-term
community, they were aimed at and directed towards the community: Japanese
supporting Japanese.
Institutions such as the embassy of Japan and the Nihonjinkai, an association
for and by Japanese living in Belgium, did not organize any support actions. This
tendency could be explained by the fact that the Nihonjinkai considers itself as
receiving partner.1⁹ The same is true for the embassy – it did not contact Japa-
nese citizens actively and none of the respondents from the interviews had con-
tacted it. A representative in Brussels explained that the embassy’s limited role
towards charity actions is due to the Japanese legal framework.2⁰ Constrained by
1⁸ Interview 12, December 10, 2012.
1⁹ Interview 9, June 4, 2012.
2⁰ Interview 1, May 22, 2012.
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this framework, the embassy can neither take up a responsible role nor organize
charity events by themselves; they are limited to supporting fundraising activities
indirectly, for example through patronage. As such, the embassy was a patron of
six support events. The embassy acted as an intermediary for the donations and
tried to assist by disseminating information on several levels, such as the website
and during cultural activities. The embassy also functioned as the official rep-
resentative of the government and seemed to concentrate on restoring people’s
trust in the government and economy, thus limiting the economic damage. At
an event attended bymore than 800 invited guests and held in theHiltonHotel in
Brussels one year after the Triple Disaster, Ambassador Yokota Jun, speaking on
behalf of the Nihonjinkai and the Ambassador of Japan to the European Union,
Shiojiri Kojiro, openly addressed politicians and policy makers, asking them to
lift the import restrictions and to support the Japanese economy.21 The event
also included a minute of silence and promotional wine tasting. Also, JETRO
focused worldwide on building up foreign investors’ trust in the Japanese econ-
omy in general and in the stricken areas by organizing conferences and briefings
for companies and business organizations. JETRO Brussels, for example, jointly
with the Mission of Japan to the European Union, held a briefing for European
companies and business organizations to explain countermeasures taken in re-
sponse to theGreat East JapanEarthquake (TheMission of Japan to the European
Union 2011).
The business community in Brussels also engaged in activities, for example,
the “HOPE” project of the Japanese carmanufacturers in Belgium (Isuzu,Mazda,
Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki and Toyota), throughwhich these companies transferred
€ 20 per car sold betweenMarch 11 and April 15, 2011 to the Japanese Red Cross
21 Ambassador Yokota Jun also expressed his regret about EU import restrictions on Japanese prod-
ucts during amemorial service at the Japanese Garden in the city of Hasselt on November 3, 2012,
which was attended by about one hundred Japanese and Belgians. As part of the ceremony, Yokota
Jun together with the president of the Belgium-Japan Association planted a cherry tree; a plaque
donated by the Belgium-Japan Association was placed. The event was framed by the female Japa-
nese choir of Brussels and a group playing Japanese drums. The photograph that was placed above
the Internet article in the Belgian newspaper De Morgen actually showed Asian faces with white
face masks and candles. The photograph was not of the ceremony in Hasselt but of a “memorial
demonstration” in Brussels mainly attended by anti-nuclear energy supporters.
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Society. A key organization in Belgian and Japanese business and cultural rela-
tions is certainly the Belgium-Japan Association, Chamber of Commerce (BJA).
The BJA, with a primarily corporate-oriented membership, supported activities
(e. g. charity concert by Seikyo Kim, May 13, 2011) and published a call for
donations as early as March 14, 2011 (Belgium-Japan Association: 2011: 2).
By March 30, thus within a mere fifteen days of the earthquake, they collected
€ 263,138; this sumwas then transferred to the Red Cross (Belgium-Japan Asso-
ciation: 1).
These events and briefings displayed a “male” official face, which stands in
contrast to the “female” face of grassroots-level activities organized for the long-
term Japanese network in Ghent (see below), where one long-term female res-
ident remarked: “Japanese men organizing Zero.”22 In the case of the short-term
resident community in Brussels, it was not individuals which functioned as hubs,
it was the organizations and companies. Japanese organizations and companies
located in Brussels engaged in calls for financial support, donated money, and
logistically supported or participated in events, but generally did not organize
events by themselves. When events were organized, they stayed within the com-
munity in terms of both population and place. The Japanese School of Brussels
can serve as an example; the school was contacted to participate in and promote
different activities.23 The Japanese School of Brussels then decided to engage
primarily in events that were somehow connected to children and education, for
example with the European School of Brussels and Dyslexia International. They
forwarded messages of support from different international schools in Brussels
to Japan. The school itself organized a “writing characters of support” event and
collected money as well, but these activities stayed within the boundaries of the
school.2⁴ One of the main charity events organized in Brussels was certainly
the Japanese charity flea market on April 3, 2011 at the Notre Dame Church in
Stockel, Sint-Pieters-Woluwe, a neighborhood with a high density of Japanese
22 Interview 11, November 7, 2012.
23 However, requests to use the school grounds for fundraising activities were denied.
2⁴ Interview 14, October 24, 2012. Interview 15, October 24, 2012. The money collected by the
Japanese schoolwas partially donated to a primary school inMiyagi through contacts of the former
school director.
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expatriates. The initiative of the flea market came from a female Japanese long-
term resident in Brussels, who had also experienced the Great Hanshin Earth-
quake in 1995.2⁵ The flea market was officially coordinated on a volunteer basis
by Misc Netto, a website organized by Japanese female volunteers living in Brus-
sels, and the web company Beru tsū. Both support the Japanese short-term com-
munity in Belgium by organizing “sayonara sales” or by providing useful infor-
mation on life and living in Belgium.2⁶ Beru tsū (2011a), with 35,000 visitors per
month on their website, is also well connected with social media and hosts a staff
blog for members, distributes a “mail magazine” and created a webpage devoted
to the triple disaster. The service offered by these websites is crucial for the Japa-
nese expatriate community in Belgium, and the organizers were able to activate
a broad network which attracted, according to the organizers, more than 3,000
participants and resulted in € 25,614 from sales as well as donations. The funds
were transferred to the embassy, which then donated the money to the Japanese
Red Cross. The organizers also reached out to the Japanese School in Brussels,2⁷
and information about the fundraising eventswas spread through the short-term
community’s information bulletin (minikomi) Petits-Pois (Puchi Powa). Thus,
the organizers could rely on a well-established institutionalized and structural
network. The volunteering participants were generally short-term Japanese res-
idents in Brussels. The flea market also included a Japanese café, chocolate and
cake shop, a shiatsu and origami workshop, Japanese drums demonstration and
a concert by Japanese musicians, thus creating a “Japanese” atmosphere. Tak-
ing into account the special situation of Brussels, flyers were printed in four
languages (Japanese, French, Dutch and English) and distributed mainly in the
Japanese community as well as in cultural and corporate circles with a strong
connection to Japan. The Japanese flyer, in contrast to the French, Dutch and
English versions, explicitly made clear that the goods sold were donated follow-
ing a call for donations and that all participants in the event, including the staff
members of the organizing companies, were volunteers and that accordingly 100
2⁵ Interview 15, October 24, 2012.
2⁶ The company name Beru tsū can be translated as “Belgium Connoisseur”. “Beru” can also mean
“bells”, which are represented in the logo.
2⁷ Interview 15, October 24, 2012.
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percent of the earned and donated money would go to the victims. Reading the
Japanese language website of Beru tsū, it becomes clear that the charity bazaar
is seen as an activity of a group of Japanese nationals that came together because
they shared the same experience and wanted to do more than “just” individu-
ally donate money: “Even if it is just a little help for the victims from the distant
Belgium.” (Beru tsū 2011b) The impression of a “Japanese-helping-Japanese”
event is also supported by the “Thank You Letter” (Orei to hōkoku) placed on the
website (Beru Tsū 2011a).
The Triple Disaster – especially the nuclear catastrophe – resulted in large-
scale protests and an increasingly political civil society in Japan. The diasporic
community in Brussels, however, limited itself to support activities, without par-
ticipating in or organizing social and political protests. Several characteristics of
the diasporic community contributed to the lack of politicization. The protest
in Japan following the Fukushima catastrophe was carried out and sustained by
students and furītā (freelance or unemployed people) up to the age of 30 and the
age group above 50.2⁸ Themajority of the short-term Japanese nationals in Brus-
sels, however, are career oriented and between 30 and 50 years old. This group
in Brussels is also well integrated into a social network based on corporate af-
filiations (Nihonjinkai) with close ties to governmental institutions. Finally, the
need to reintegrate after their return alsomeant that members of the community
in Brussels did not take an openly critical position concerning the political es-
tablishment.2⁹ Age structure, employment situation, social as well as corporate
bonds that discourage political activities, and the need to reintegrate can explain
the lack of political protest in Brussels.
3.2 Activating Networks: Japanese Long-Term Female Residents in Ghent
When focusing on the long-term residents in the city of Ghent, we discovered
that the four interviewees do not consider themselves as part of a general Japa-
nese diaspora. They belong to different informal “Japanese” sub-groups, formed
2⁸ For the protests in Japan following the nuclear catastrophe, see Gengenbach and Trunk (2012).
2⁹ One interviewed short-term resident from Brussels commented on the decreasing application of
Japanese teachers wanting to go abroad by giving the following reasons: low income, missing the
development in Japan and easier life in Japan; Interview 15, October 24, 2012.
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by the parameters of children (age and school), work place and social activi-
ties. These sub-groups form loose networks that are held together by the identity
marker “homeland” and through events such as a New Year’s dinner once a year,
occasional “ladies nights”, and activities with children.
All long-term interviewees in Ghent participated in several fundraising and
support activities, usually events organized by Japanese friends or acquaintances.
The members of the overlapping networks informed other members to spread
the information on fundraising activities to such an extent that one interviewee
fromGhent remarked: “It was impossible to go to all support events. There were
just too many.”3⁰ The activities organized were directed towards an “outside”,
non-Japanese audience – mainly Belgians who are in one way or another con-
nected to Japan economically or culturally – for example, students of Japanese
studies, martial arts clubs, people who went to a Japanese concert or movie. The
activities of these groups show a high degree of cultural knowledge of the host
country because they are using events and networks in daily Belgian social life.
The support and fundraising events organized by the permanent Japanese cit-
izens were not initiated by a given and well-defined group but by individuals
functioning as hubs. These Japanese individuals used their contacts to activate
and rely on informal networks that are not limited to Japanese nationals.
The support events as reaction to the shared experience of shock, on the one
hand, strengthened the networking system of the Japanese citizens and brought
the participants closer together (although just for a short period of time); on the
other hand, pre-existing trenches were reaffirmed: “The support activities did
not really change the community of Japanese in Ghent, but people who did not
want to do anything gave a weird feeling and the friendship has cooled down.
We didn’t want to press. We are disappointed.”31
In the following section, we will exemplify these findings by focusing on the
activities and support events initiated by two female permanent residents in
Ghent. The flea market sales action at the church of St. Jacob in Ghent is a
traditional, semi-professional flea market with regular stands and is held every
3⁰ Interview 11, November 7, 2012.
31 Interview 12, December 10, 2012.
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week from Friday to Sunday; it is an excellent example of how the support ac-
tions of the permanent community were embedded into Belgian community life.
A long-term, single, Japanese businesswoman in Ghent organized the charity
sales action at this flea market, which was supported by other long-term female
residents and their Belgian husbands. Selling at long-established, local markets
requires a permit, which cannot be obtained easily. In the case of the support
action, however, the organizer was able to use the reserved space of a friend and
just needed a permit for this particular event. The products sold were donated
by friends and acquaintances, contacted via e-mail, telephone, Twitter and Face-
book, and included typical products that could be expected to be on sale at flea
markets as well as products of Japanese origin. It was clearly marked that the
products were sold for charity reasons and a charity box with a short explana-
tory text in Dutch and a hinomaru (flag of Japan) was placed on the sales stand
as well. Because the regulations prohibit placing charity boxes on sales stands,
a special permit was also obtained from the city hall. Using a traditional Belgian
flea market for a support action requires cultural, structural and administrative
understanding as well as an engagement with the city and its people. This kind of
specific cultural knowledge, which also shows a certain degree of embeddedness
into the host community and its social network, cannot be obtained by short-
term residents. When arguing from the point of network analysis, we can state
that the organizers were able to find a common code of cultural communication,
a code that could be understood by the members of the home community.32 The
flea market itself was “broadcast” live on a video on the Ricobel blog, which is
linked to the company of the organizer and meant for Japanese with an interest
in Belgian culture.
Concerning the flea market in Ghent, the way the money was donated also
shows a high degree of social network within the host community. Most charity
actions donated the money directly to the Red Cross in Japan or Belgium. In
the case of the flea market sale in Ghent, the organizers bought toys and sweets
for children and sent these to the city of Kanazawa, from where they were finally
forwarded to the areas hit by the triple disaster. Choosing Kanazawa seems odd
32 For network analysis, see especially Blumer (1992).
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at first because Kanazawa is about 420 kilometers away from Fukushima prefec-
ture. However, the organizer was aware of the fact that Ghent and Kanazawa are
sister cities, and through personal contacts inGhent’s city hall, shewas able to use
her social network for this action. In this sense, the action also strengthened the
Ghent-Kanazawa connection. Besides speaking of a communality of practice, it
is also important to mention the communication of practice, for example, the
dissemination and publication of support activities, fundraising and donations.
The gift-giving was also mentioned in two newspaper articles in the Hokkoku
Shimbun, a regional tabloid from Kanazawa. In the article, the toys and sweets
received were clearly marked as gifts from an individual Japanese female living
in Ghent, Belgium. The two headlines read: “From Belgium to the children of
the stricken area. Mrs. Ō from Ghent entrusts the city with toys and sweets”
and the second header refers to the gifts as “Belgian toys to the stricken areas.
Mrs. Ō from Ghent City. Entrusting sister city Kanazawa.” The latter article also
shows two photos of the gifts being placed on a conference table and arranged
by a Caucasian woman (in one photo also watched by a Japanese woman) who,
although not identified in the article, is the Belgian Coordinator of International
Affairs at Kanazawa City Hall.
Support activities obviously have the intrinsic meaning of offering material
and moral relief to the disaster-stricken regions. However, the activities also
serve the secondary purpose of creating communality and belonging; therefore,
it is crucial to communicate the realized activities and the gift-giving of those
“inside” the community to those on the “outside”.
An excellent example for the importance of communication is the produc-
tion of three videos by the above-mentioned businesswoman with messages of
support and sympathy for the victims in Japan.Thus, support activities were not
limited to providing financial and material support; they also extended to ac-
tivities such as offering messages of solidarity that were meant to give moral
support. These messages were considered to be equally important as financial
or material support, which Ruth Martin also shows in her analysis of support
activities in London for the triple disaster. The people who appeared in the two
videos, “A support message from Belgium (1)/ (2) Be strong, Japan! (Berugī kara
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ōenmessēji [1]/ [2] Ganbare Nippon!)”, were Ghent citizens, one city official, local
traders or teachers, and students fromGhent University, all somehow connected
to Japan or to the Japanese living in Ghent or visiting the city. Among them was
the chocolatier on the Korenlei (a famous tourist spot), who counts many Japa-
nese tourists among his clientele. TheLet’s Speak Japanese Club (Nihongo hanasō
kai) fromAntwerp also added amessage of encouragement. The third video was
a personal message from the mayor of Ghent, Daniel Termont. The oral Eng-
lish and Japanese messages were subtitled in Japanese and placed on YouTube as
well as on the aforementioned Ricobel blog. The comments posted on both sites
as well as numerous letters sent to Ghent University show that Japanese in the
homeland indeed seemed to notice and appreciate the messages sent. Japanese
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national TV station NHK also chose certain scenes for a sequel of support mes-
sages from all over the world that was shown regularly in commercial breaks the
months following the triple disaster.
The videos of support were born from the personal experience of shock, which
resulted in the urge to support the Japanese in the stricken areas.33 However, the
videos can also be linked to the corporate world because the Ricobel blog, where
the videos were posted, is run by the Ricobel company, which is also mentioned
at the end of the video messages.
In the second example, another individual female employee in Ghent utilized
thework environment for organizing support activities. She functioned as hub in
at least two fundraising events. Inspired by the example of a Japanese colleague’s
sister who folded and sold tsuru (origami cranes) in Japan, she and the colleague
participated in the Orizuru PrayforJapan support activity and folded origami
cranes togetherwith volunteering colleagues. On theOrizuru PrayforJapanweb-
site (2011), the company receives special thanks from the organizers. The orga-
nizers visited other offices in their building and sold the cranes for the victims of
the disaster for the price of € 1. This activity was extended to the private context
by organizing tsuru activities at the schools of the interviewees’ children and also
at the judo club of one of the children. The paper crane is a basic origami figure
that can easily be folded and is thus very well suited for a group activity involving
children. In one case, after obtaining permission from the school director, the
two Japanese women – dressed in kimonos – visited all classes in this school over
a period of two days and folded cranes together with the attending school chil-
dren. The children thenwent home to sell the cranes to their parents, friends and
neighbors. In a second activity, the annual Japanese film festival Japan Square, of
which one interviewee is board member, served as platform for a tsuru sale ac-
tion.3⁴ In both cases the organizers donated themoney to the RedCross Flanders
and also received permission to use the Red Cross logo (Orizuru PrayForJapan
2011; Shinema tudei 2011).
33 Interview 11, November 7, 2012.
3⁴ Interview 12, December 10, 2012. Interview 13, December 10 2012. On March 11, 2012 the film
festival also showed the film A Sketch of Mujo, a documentary on the Tōhoku disaster.
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In contrast to the above-mentioned flea market activity, the tsuru activity was
based on and made use of stereotypical and easily recognizable elements of Ja-
panese culture for their fundraising activity, thereby making the activity readily
identifiable as an activity related to Japan.3⁵ The crane is a bird of cultural sig-
nificance in Japan, expressing hope, long life, recovery from illness and injury,
peace, and now increasingly stands for solidarity. Through the tragic story of
the Hiroshima atom bomb victim Sasaki Sadako, the crane is well known also
in Belgium as a symbol of nuclear disarmament. The link with the nuclear catas-
trophe of Fukushima made the crane a symbol that could also be interpreted as
protest against nuclear energy. The Japanese embassy also received a number of
origami cranes (single or in a string of 1000 senbazuru), which were displayed
in a special exhibition at the Cultural and Information Centre of the embassy as
token of gratitude following the triple disaster.3⁶
4 Practicing Communality
The support activities by Japanese nationals living in Belgium – long-term or
short-term – were marked by the commitment to their home country. When
Japanese artists organised exhibitions, classical concerts and other charity events
under the name “ACT FOR JAPAN”, they stated that the group’s purpose is to
provide relief to the “homeland”:
We are trying to unite our efforts and act to support our home country. From
Belgium, where we are blessed with a rich cultural environment and opportu-
nity to share our art, we pray for Japan’s rebirth and declare the message that
no matter how hard it may be, Japan will rise up and shine again, just like the
sun always rises in the morning. In this time of darkness, Japan needs your
3⁵ This activity was referred to as “Japan Square-Tsuru Ladies” in the Trade Flows & Cultural News,
the official magazine of the Belgium-Japan Association, Chamber of Commerce, and has a circu-
lation of 2,500 print copies.
3⁶ Also other Japanese and Belgians who organized fundraising events and moral support activities
also used the crane as trademark that could easily be recognized, for example, The Dinner of the
Rising Sun in the Palace of the Colonies (Tervuren, Brussels) on May 26, 2011. For the price of
€ 200, which was donated to the Red Cross, guests were served a four-course dinner by Japanese
and Belgian top chefs. The event was organized by a non-profit organization, whose representative
is the sushi-chef of the Antwerp-based restaurant Ko’uzi, Kawada Junko, a long-term resident. The
names of the chefs as well as the names of their restaurants were mentioned on the advertisement.
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support. Until the day we overcome the difficulties and smile again, we will
join our hands and act for Japan. (Act for Japan 2011)3⁷
Long-term residents often tend to display a romantic, idealized, as well as stereo-
typical view of their home country, which becomes – borrowing a termMarilyn
Ivy (1995) used – a kind of “internal exotic”. For Singapore, Eyal Ben-Ari (2003:
128) states: “the Japanese expatriates discover their ’Japanese-ness’”. The web-
sites and flyers of support events display elements of a stereotypical and romantic
(or even better, nostalgic) construction of Japan and Japaneseness. This practice
of preserving and even exhibiting a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host soci-
ety can be linked to one of the core elements of a diaspora, which according
to Brubaker is “boundary-maintenance” (Brubaker 2005). The triple disaster
consequently increased a sense of being Japanese and the awareness of Japanese
cultural identity, as one short-term resident from Brussels remarked:
We became aware again about the bad and good sides of being Japanese. There
are good things like immediate organization of reconstruction, but the chaos
also let the dark sides of the people come to light, for example, profiting from
the confusion, taking away or stealing things from others, not taking into con-
sideration the situation at hand. We are used to thinking that these things do
not exist in our society, but they do. The will to survive, to protect oneself, and
to rescue was overwhelming. I think that the Japanese as a nation did not take
enough responsibility for what has happened.3⁸
The way the community tried to recover and reconstruct resulted in a feeling of
togetherness and also in a promise to the future, based on the construction of
ties between people.
Even before [the triple disaster] I had met these people [who were organizing
the flea market], but I also met other Japanese people through them, and by
organizing this flea market together, it felt as though the power of solidarity
(danketsuryoku ga umareta) as Japanese emerged.3⁹
3⁷ The website also displays a message to the victims of the triple disaster in the Tōhoku region. It
is striking that the term furusato is used when referring to Japan: “What had happened in our
home(land).” The term “furusato”, which Christine Yano (2002: 17) refers to as “the focal point
of nostalgia andmemory” refers, on the one hand, to one’s (rural) place of birth and to the “idea of
originary, emotive space and homeland”, on the other hand (Robertson 1991: 5, 14).
3⁸ Interview 8, May 24, 2014.
3⁹ This quotewasmade by a short-term resident in Brussels and is taken fromanonline questionnaire
conducted by BA and MA students at Ghent University in 2011.
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This quote is especially striking because the phrase danketsuryoku ga umareta,
which is translated here with the “power of solidarity emerged”, can also mean
the “ability to join activities emerged”. This, first of all, refers to something that
was felt to be absent thus far, namely a feeling of solidarity as a Japanese, a feeling
that Japan lacked a civil society,⁴⁰ or as one interviewee put it: “Before I used to
think that Japanese are egoistic, but this is changing now. They now know that
we have to help each other. […]They are more concerned. Their heart’s eye has
opened.”⁴1
Yet, where in Japan the term kizuna (binding) was used to describe the feel-
ing of standing together after the catastrophe, none of the participants used this
word in describing the feeling of solidarity. Even more, the above quote suggests
a complex field of inclusion and exclusion because the speaker creates an emo-
tional distance with the Japanese back “home” by using the grammatical markers
of “I”, “we” and “they”.
5 Conclusion
We have argued that a group creates or re-confirms itself (from within) through
practice. Despite the differences between both long-term and short-term dias-
poric communities, the triple disaster and its aftermath served as a catalyst for
increased communication on a personal level within the community. As such,
the (closed) community of short-term Japanese nationals strengthened and re-
inforced their ties within the Japanese community, while the permanent Japa-
nese nationals in Belgium strengthened their contacts with other Japanese, and
also reached out to Belgian nationals for participation in charity events. How-
ever, the strengthening of togetherness was – because the practice of support
⁴⁰ For the definition of the term “civil society” in Japan, see especially Ducke (2007). In Japan, the
redefinition of the cultural and social system and the rediscovery of the civil society is coined in
the term kizuna (bonds; connection), which was chosen to be the word of the year in 2011. For
the controversial discussion of the term kizuna in Japan, see Tagsold (2012). Already in December
2011, a new political party namedNewKizuna (Shintō Kizuna) was founded; it exploited the term
kizuna for political ends. The party dissolved before the general election in December 2012. The
main political aims were economic oriented and were directed against the proposal to raise the
consumption tax as well as against the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. See Kizuna Party.
⁴1 Interview 3, June 8, 2012.
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was limited in time – only a temporary manifestation, following the first months
after the triple disaster. The support events also served as a means to further
define network boundaries because not all Japanese nationals were equally will-
ing to participate in volunteer activities. The organization of support actions
thus strengthened already-existing divisions and provided an acceptable reason
for further alienation. Support activities not only strengthened the awareness
of “Japaneseness” and of being Japanese, but also added – at least temporarily
– the notion of a “civil society” as a new element of Japaneseness: the ability to
stand together and support each other in times of catastrophe not only individu-
ally or locally but also nationally. In Japan, this feeling of solidarity also meant
a politicization of civil society, whereas the support activities of the diasporic
community in Belgium, in essence, remained apolitical and supportive of the
existing political system.
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3/11 and the Japanese in London
Ruth Martin
On themorning ofMarch 11 2011 devastating news from Japan reached London.
What became known as the Great East Japan Earthquake had struck Tohoku
at 2.46 pm – 6.46 am in London. The news had special significance for over
63,000 Japanese residents in the UK, as well as the community of “friends of
Japan”, which has built up as a result of diplomatic, business and personal links,
especially over the past sixty years.
This chapter begins by explaining the presence of Japanese in the UK and the
different groups that make up the Japanese community. It continues by outlin-
ing three phases following the disaster: The first was characterized by a state of
shock and chaos during which time there seemed to be a coming together of
the groups that have previously tended to be separate and hierarchically distinc-
tive. A spirit of communitas, common following disaster, was evident (Turner
2012). The second was a compulsion to do something. At first to donate fi-
nancially, or to organize fund raising activities which brought sections of the
community together. A third was marked by a change in attitude towards do-
nating and an apparent waning of the spirit of communitas as members of the
community concentrated on the professions that had originally brought them to
the UK.The chapter offers explanations and suggests lessons that may have been
learnt. It points out the significant role played by Japanese who may previously
have tended to operate on the periphery of the diplomatic and corporate world,
including permanent residents. This is particularly relevant in terms of diaspora
studies, along with the role of the UK as a welcoming host country.
1 Introduction: A Brief History and Explanation of Japanese Presence in
the UK
The notion of global diaspora has been used in the context of migration over
the past fifty to sixty years. It is particularly influenced by the global economy,
characterised by the movement of transient professionals and their families and
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supported by those who make up the network of infrastructure that grows in
order to support them. Anglo-Japanese relations are in fact long standing. 2013
saw events in the UK marking the 400th anniversary of the opening of trade,
scientific, cultural and diplomatic ties between Britain and Japan. Relations had
strengthened following the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1858) and shortly
after this the existing legations in each country were elevated to the status of Em-
bassy. Britain supported the Japanese during the Russo Japanese War (1904-5)
and in order to support the war efforts it was during this time that the first Japa-
nese bank , the Yokohama Specie Bank, opened in London, subsequently playing
a vital role in the development of the Japanese economic ties with London.
However, after the FirstWorldWar, NewYork rather than London became the
global financial centre, and in the 1920s and 30s economic friction developed
between Britain and Japan. The setting up of a puppet state in Manchuria by
the latter along with aggression in China led to growing British unease, with the
two nations becoming enemies in 1941 during the SecondWorldWar. After the
peace treaty of 1952, relations between the two were described simply as cold
and suspicious’ (Cortazzi 2001: xviii), and were hampered by memories of the
British defeat in Singapore and the issue of prisoners of war.
After World War II Japanese banks returned to London, initially to help fi-
nance trade, and then from the 1960s to finance the expansion of Japanese man-
ufacturing in the United Kingdom (ibid). This heralded a growth of the Japa-
nese community in the UK when records of the number of Japanese residents
registered with the Japanese Embassy in London were first published. Japanese
investment in the UK grew in the 1970s, but it was during the 1980s that Japa-
nese presence in the city of London grew to its height. This was due to a rapidly
expanding Japanese economy, reinforced by strong credit ratings, large cash re-
serves generated by the high rate of Japanese consumer saving, and rising prop-
erty prices (Newhall 1996; Sakai 2000).
By 1990, more than fifty Japanese financial institutions had established repre-
sentative offices in London (Sakai 2000) and Japanese manufacturing increased
accordingly. In 1987 there were 50 established manufacturing projects in the
UK, by 1989 there were over 95 (Sasao 1990). In the 1980s all of the major Japa-
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nese consumer electrical companies had at least one plant in Britain, often sited
in a regional development area, or a so-called New Town, such as Telford and
Milton Keynes, where they received incentives from local British authorities. As
of May 2011, shortly after the earthquake and tsunami, the UK was home to
120 European headquarters including Nissan, Honda and Toyota which man-
ufacture 50% of vehicles in the UK – more than 130,000 jobs are provided by
Japanese companies. Japan is currently the number two investor in the UK, and
with investments worth £ 22 billion, it represents themost important destination
in the EU for Japan (Embassy of Japan 2011).
Accordingly, the population of Japanese living in theUKhas steadily increased.
In 1960, when records were first published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
792 Japanese were registered with the Embassy of Japan in London as being resi-
dents in the UK. In 1970 the number had reached 2,806. By 1980 that number
was 10,943; by 1990 44,351; by 2000 53,114 and in 2011 the number had risen
to 63,011 (ibid). The UK is currently home to the largest number of Japanese
in Europe and has the fourth largest population of Japanese overseas behind the
United States, China and Australia. Registering at the embassy is not compul-
sory, so these figures may not represent the true number of Japanese living in
the UK. The majority (58.2 percent) live in and around London where the head
offices of many of the financial institutions and corporations are based.
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs divides this population according
to purpose of stay: private company staff, journalists/press, self employed, and
those working for government (these groups represent a largely transient popu-
lation). In 2011 private company staff accounted for 28% of the total figure, and
adding the total of press, self employed, those working for government and oth-
ers, the total percentage of this transient professional population for 2011 was
43%. In addition, students/teachers/researchers represent a further 33% of the
total, with permanent residents representing 24% (Embassy of Japan 2011; See
Table 2).
Reactions to the disaster highlight four main players amongst this Japanese
population that are the focus of this chapter: representatives of the government
from the Japanese Embassy of Japan, the Japanese Corporate world, students,
63
Ruth Martin
and permanent residents. The latter may be sub-divided into Japanese
“entrepreneurs” who have broken away from the Japanese corporate world to set
up their own independent businesses in the UK; those Japanese who aremarried
to non-Japanese and now residing in the UK, and those who are based in the UK
for the purpose of a particular talent , including musicians, dancers and artists.
The latter represents an interesting development in Japanese transnational mi-
gration, meriting further attention in diaspora studies.
In comparison to some diaspora communities elsewhere, it is important to
note that a defining feature of those making up the population of Japanese is
their educated middle class and, although in the 1980s there was a feeling that
those who had spent time overseas may not be quite Japanese’ on their return,
this group has come to represent a kind of elite in Japan. Studies of bankers
have suggested that for many male managers, overseas transfer is an indication
of future career prospects and the launch pad for  future top managers (Hamada
1992; Morgan, Kelly, Sharpe and Whitely 2003). In the case of one particular
bank for example, it was estimated that between twenty and thirty percent of
themanaging directors had international experience (Morgan, Kelly, Sharpe and
Whitely 2003). This group of senior managers has contributed to a group of pro-
fessionals in London which has often had more than one posting representing
promotion on each occasion. These professionals have often developed close ties
with the country – personal friends they havemade through the Anglo-Japanese
friendship groups mentioned below and within the business community. They
also represent a privileged group of internationally-minded Japanese who come
to move across the national boundaries between Japan and the UK with ease,
including when their children remain in the UK to study, work or live upon
marriage to non-Japanese after their own repatriation. As such, they seem to
have a foot in both countries (Martin 2007) and the personal links they form
during multiple postings is significant as this chapter will show.
Beneath the senior management level are those junior staff, and by definition
their younger family members, whose experience in London may be very differ-
ent from that of their senpai (seniors). Their overseas living allowances are less
generous and, with the exception of mothers with young children at local non-
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Japanese schools, they are more likely to be existing outside the Anglo-Japanese
networks described below. Theymay live in areas in which there is a high density
of other Japanese, with an infrastructure of food shops, travel and estate agents,
insurance companies and a Japanese school nearby. They may have less chance
to return to Japan during their transfer period than seniormanagement and their
point of reference to the homeland may therefore be different from their senior
management colleagues.
The main groups within the Japanese community are quite distinctive and
usually separate. The business community is particularly hierarchical andwithin
it certain leading Japanese companies and their senior management play a piv-
otal role. These includeMitsubishi andMitsui, reflecting two of the original “Big
Four” corporate groups mentioned above. The heads of such companies in Lon-
don, being head not only of the London branch but also in Europe, are at the
top of the social hierarchy. This is evident in the network of Japanese business
ties and subsequent social functions that ensue. They seem second only to the
Japanese Ambassador and Senior Ministers of the Embassy of Japan, though in
fact the links between the two may, by necessity, be close and characterized by
mutual respect.
Of permanent residents, themajority of those Japanesewomenwho havemar-
ried non-Japanese men have tended to remain on the periphery of the social
scene that revolves around the somewhat elite business world. The exception to
this would be the rare cases of Japanese married to Britishmen who are senior in
the business or diplomatic world, often with a relationship to Japan themselves.
There are also a number of entrepreneurs’ some of whom first came to London
as transient professionals themselves who have their own business interest in the
UK and who retain status and links with the Japanese corporate world.
Side by side, and partly overlapping with the Japanese ‘business and diplo-
matic elite’ in London are the members of a similarly elite Anglo-Japanese com-
munity that has developed since diplomatic ties became formalized, made up of
leading Japanese corporate members and their wives and of British ‘friends of
Japan’, typically British who have worked in Japan as expatriates in important
British companies in Japan, such as Shell, or for the diplomatic service. There
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are also scholars who were sent to Japan after the war who retain strong ties and
research interests and who have played an important role in Anglo-Japanese un-
derstanding over the years. Some of these ties are based on years of professional
and personal contact with Japan, building upon the personal links and friend-
ships made over time as a result. They are often members of The Japan Society
or ofNichi-Ei Otomodachi Kai (an Anglo-Japanese Friendship Group for women
founded in 1962).
Here I focus on the Japanese reactions to the disaster and on the reactions of
the Anglo-Japanese community in London, as the financial and business centre,
accounting for the densest population of Japanese not only in the UK, but also in
Europe. Themore elite businessworld and the relatedAnglo-Japanese friendship
network discussed above are axiomatically centred here. However, following the
disaster, fund raising activities took place all over the country and support came
from all sections of British society:  Japanese Embassy staff in Londonwere faced
with a huge work load, personally attending as many of the fund raising events
as possible, sometimes several events in a day.
2 The First Phase: Shock and Emotion in the Immediate Aftermath
The first three months were characterized by shock. Japanese ballerina Miyako
Yoshida, who was then based in London, summed up well the experience of
many Japanese residents in the UK on hearing the news of the disaster: ”I first
found out about it on the BBC news. It’s difficult to describe. I was shaking... I
felt the blood drain from my face... I was panicking..... I immediately contacted
Japan, and got in touch with my family and friends.” (Yoshida 2011)
The Embassy of Japan in London became the focal point for the deluge en-
quiries from Japanese residents concerned about family members and friends
in Japan, as well as about the safety of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant. The Embassy seemed to many the obvious first point of call and its role
as representative of the Japanese government was paramount in the immediate
aftermath. These were additional to diplomatic roles that needed to be carried
out, includingmanaging the departure of the envoys that had been offered by the
British Government. Only one day after the disaster, Britain was the first to send
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out a search and rescue team, and so began the job for Embassy staff of making
arrangements for the team and their two dogs. The team consisted of 59 special-
ists, two rescue dogs and four medical staff, who spent four days searching the
towns of Ofun and Kamaishi following the earthquake and tsunami. The spe-
cialists came from Lancashire, Lincolnshire. Greater Manchester, West Sussex,
Kent, West midlands, Mid andWestWales, Hertfordshire and Cheshire. As well
as the rescue team, theUnitedKingdomgovernment offered 100 tons of drinking
water to Ibaraki Prefecture and on April 2 provided nuclear related-equipment
(radiation survey meters, protective masks etc.).
Another role carried out by the Embassy in its diplomatic capacity was to open
a book of condolences. This allowed both Japanese citizens and members of the
British public to express their solidarity with and sympathy for Japan on paper –
a mainly symbolic gesture, but the act of expression felt important to those who
participated and did not go unnoticed by Diplomatic staff. Between March 1
to 23 over 500 people visited the Embassy to sign , including the PrimeMinister
David Cameron, Foreign SecretaryWilliamHague and theDuchess andDuke of
Gloucester; the Duke has strong links with Japan, is patron of the Japan Society,
and on this occasion signed on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen. In real terms,
however, the number signing represents a tiny fraction of Japanese residents in
the UK and did not represent an adequate or realistic gesture for many, who re-
mained unsure of what to do, how to contribute or how to express their emotion
and concern.
During this time, one London-based Japanese musician in particular was able
to capture the spirit of fellow Japanese and provide a platform for them, not only
to give financially in the collection buckets provided, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, to gather together in one place and show solidarity for Japan. His first ap-
pearance was only three days after the earthquake when he played at Mitsukoshi
Department Store in London’s Regent Street. Some 500, mainly Japanese, gath-
ered to hear him and around £ 15,000was collected. Another concert was held in
the Fortnum andMason store and he also busked in KensingtonHigh Street and
London St Pancreas Station. In the early days, letting Japan know that Japanese
overseas were expressing solidarity was as vital as any fund raising effort. The
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message seemed to be, ‘We are all the same Japanese identity’, or onaji nihonjin
dōshi.
Such reactions appeared to demonstrate what Edith Turner refers to as the
communitas of disaster (2012: 76) and how sharing a common experience can
bring individuals onto an equal level (Turner 1969: 132). Japanese responses
clearly demonstrated this levelling effect amongst the three groups which were
normally clearly definedhierarchically. Superficially at least, the period appeared
to show all sections of a community that is normally defined by strict hierarchy,
marked by the social groups outlined above, to be united in a spirit of ‘affect’ or
emotion’ (see Besnier’s Introduction).
A key factor that united Japanese residents during this time was being Japa-
nese. A study of the wives of Japanese professionals in London showed how
temporary residence in the UK leads to an appreciation of both the positive and
negative aspects of the host country, which can in turn lead to a heightened sense
of home (Martin 2007). Japanese mothers reported that they felt an increased
burden to pass on a knowledge and awareness of their Japanese identity to their
children in the same way that their own mothers had in Japan (ibid). As Befu
states, ‘sometimes expatriates are the most ardent patriots’ (2001: 16) and per-
haps no more so than at a time of disaster.
Another factor unifying the Japanese populations was concern about family
members in Japan (expressed in the enquiries to the Embassy above). It is par-
ticularly pertinent for transient professionals for whom a temporary job transfer
may have meant leaving children behind at school, university or work in Japan,
and/or elderly parents. With concerns about radiation fromFukushima, and sto-
ries in London of water and power cuts along with the fear of aftershocks, the de-
sire to call such children to join them to safety in London was strong, but mixed
with feelings of guilt at the thought of doing so. In line with many expatriate
British working in Tokyo at the time, children and family members themselves
commonly felt that they could not leave Japan. There was also a corresponding
feeling of guilt amongst some Japanese in London that theywere safewhile fellow
Japanese were suffering. The issue of guilt suffered when ‘spared’ from natural
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disaster to the Holocaust is of course the focus of a whole body of literature (e. g.
Lifton 1993).
A further unifying factor was the realization that an earthquake, which ev-
ery Japanese citizen has prepared for since drills at kindergarten, had actually
happened. And not only that it had occurred but that they were not there at the
time and ‘It could have beenme.’  Moreover, since the possibility of future earth-
quakes remain, It could still be me’.
In the aftermath, worldwide media focussed keenly on the resilience of the
Japanese people, and for Japanese residents in London, there was a pride and
almost comfort in this ‘gambarou’ spirit which further united them.
3 The Second Phase: The Urge to Do Something
Out of the shock rose the urge to do something. Besnier reminds us that here is
a strong link between affect and action, and communitas has been argued to rep-
resent activity rather than a state (Turner 2012: 221). The compulsion to act was
expressed firstly in terms of making financial donations and of either organiz-
ing or attending the plethora of fund raising activities held all over the country.
The mantra of “donations, donations, donations” along with the organization of
charity events to provide such donations was dominant.
From the time the news broke, in addition to dealing with the mass of en-
quiries mentioned above, a further major task for the Embassy of Japan had
been to respond to the financial donations from both Japanese residents and
the British alike, perhaps outside the normal remit of its diplomatic role. Due
to massive demand, the Embassy started accepting donations to be forwarded
to the Japanese Red Cross. The Red Cross Fund eventually raised an estimated
£ 14.2 million world-wide, which was essential in the immediate aftermath to
provide urgent medical care and psychosocial support; to distribute blankets,
clothing and other relief items; to support social welfare services; construct tem-
porary hospitals; support children’s education; improve the living conditions of
people in evacuation centers or temporary housing, and to help people affected
by the nuclear power plant disaster (BritishRedCross 2011). The Embassy also
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offered a further service: to list, and thereby publicize, all events held by various
groups and organizations in aid of the disaster relief.
Fund raising took the form of bazaars, auctions, concerts, street collections
and more. Japanese mothers and young children as well as university students
arranged events. Donations came from all sections of the community – from
Japanese mothers and their children, school children, groups and organizations,
Japanese companies and from corresponding initiatives from British citizens.
Japanese Embassy staff in London were faced with a huge work load, person-
ally attending as many of the fund raising events as possible, sometimes several
events in a day in order to represent the support and appreciation of the Japa-
nese government. The Ambassador himself hosted a bazaar at his official res-
idence, which was supported by the Embassy and organized mainly by Eikoku
Fujin Kai (The Japanese Women’s Association in Great Britain). Attended by
more than 450 invited guests, including representative of both the Japanese and
British communities as well as those from the diplomatic corps in London, the
amount of sales on the day was over £ 40,000. The total sum raised by dona-
tions was remarkably in six figures - over £ 250,000 - Japanese corporations and
individuals having also donated generously.
The urge to do something resulted in members of the different groups coming
into contact with those from other groups that they may not have otherwise had
contact with. Embassy staff said that they met individuals outside their usual
network that they would not otherwise have come in contact with. Through
word ofmouth and social networks including Facebook, other Japanese residents
began to discover fellow Japanese living or working nearby, for example students
discovered fellow Japanese at their university or college they never knew existed.
They began to gather to discuss organizing bucket collections and other activities
on campus. Annual events held at the Embassy since the disaster, such as the
Emperor’s birthday celebration, seemed to have hosted a greater number and
wider range of guests in reflection of the number and range of individuals met
through their contribution to the relief aid.
Several other factors accelerated the apparent breaking down of the formal
social hierarchy within the Japanese community. First was the fact that the af-
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termath – especially the first three months – was a period of relative chaos, and
the emergency of the situation meant that there was no time for the usual Japa-
nese lengthy decision-making process and there was no comparable precedent
to follow since the Kobe earthquake of 1995. Japanese residents quickly relied on
new social networks, such as Facebook, both to gain information about the situ-
ation in Tohoku and subsequently to disseminate information on fund raising
events in the UK. These social media are not respecters of any social hierarchy
that allows business and diplomatic circles to have privileged information of, and
access to, events or information.
For example, news of a performance organized by ballerina  Miyako Yoshida
at the Royal Opera House was spread by the internet, – on ballet blogs and social
networking sites – and by word of mouth. It sold out in days without any other
advertising means. The wife of the London and European Head of a Japanese
company, who might normally have enjoyed seeing Miyako from the stalls of
the Opera House thanks to settai (client entertaining) was to be seen queuing for
returns – which she did not get. Furthermore, she did not seem tomind: she was
there and the cause was more important than seeing the performance. Normally
within the Japanese community, events would require planning and would go
through appropriate networks of communication. Events such as the ballet gala
were organized at short notice, bypassing the accepted social etiquette that is
particularly defined amongst the diplomatic and business networks.
The relatively short notice at which amemorial service was organized atWest-
minster Abbey on Sunday, June 5th, just under three months after the disaster
was another example of breaking down social hierarchy and of the spirit of com-
munitas. Anyone was entitled to apply for tickets from the Westminster Abbey
office and within the Abbey, seating seemed to be relatively free and removed
from the normal constraints of etiquette that may have seen the Ambassador
and heads of major companies seated accordingly and greeted with ceremony.
The service itself reflected all sections of the Japanese community and friends of
Japan, from the Ambassador to Japanese school children and, if anything, was
orchestrated by certain permanent residents, who may normally be on the pe-
riphery of the hierarchical business and diplomatic world, but who had contacts
71
Ruth Martin
with the church in the UK or with musical community that contributed to the
service. Contributions to the service indicated a collaboration between all sec-
tions of the community aswell as the strength ofAnglo-Japanese links, such as an
address by the British church minister who had worked as a minister in Japan,
and a testimony by a Japanese Professor of Ophthalmology currently working
at University College London. In addition to the Christian service and hymns,
Buddhist monks offered prayers for the living and the dead, and traditional Ja-
panesemusic was played at the end of the service. In an unprecedentedmove the
Japanese flag was flown above the Abbey – somewhat symbolic in view of past
war-related memories touched upon in the Introduction. The mood therefore
seemed to be one of unity – between all sections of the Japanese community and
between the UK and Japan.
4 TheThird Phase: Changing Attitudes to Financial Giving and the
Return to Daily Life in London
As time went on it was inevitable that enthusiasm for financial donation waned
as residents went about the business of their daily lives, particularly in the case
of transient professionals and their families who tend to feel strong obligation
to their work and very purpose for being in the UK. This is especially the case
of more middle of junior management who are particularly conscious of their
obligations to the company they represent. There is a limit to how much an in-
dividual can financially donate and to how many events they can attend. After
a while people naturally began to tire of the plethora of charity events, or felt
obliged to attend simply because they were Japanese. As residents attended to
their daily business, a return to the hierarchies of the corporate and diplomatic
worlds that are defining features of the diaspora in question was inevitable.
People also wondered what had happened to the amounts of money raised.
Students who had gathered to collect in buckets on University campuses could
not see what had happened to the money. They could not be sure that their hard
work had actually done good. With so many separate groups collecting, there
was also concern whether money was getting to where it was meant to, or where
it was neededmost, and howevermisguided, some also expressed dissatisfaction
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with the Red Cross, suspicious that with such a large charitable organization,
much would be spent on administration costs rather directly to the cause. Some
worried that their contributions would go to other projects within the Red Cross
umbrella rather than to Tohoku. All of this was contributed to as realization that
perhaps something more than financial donations was needed to help victims,
support local businesses and to rebuild the local economy for the long term.
In setting up its own fund, (The Tohoku Earthquake Relief Fund), The Japan
Society Fund had been quick to realize the importance of liaison with local vol-
untary, community andnon-profit organizations (NPOs). Other Japanese groups
and individuals in the UK began to realize that more emphasis was now needed
on this approach, rather than on just giving financially, and to realise that to
contributions in the form of offers of help, or of pro bono donations in terms of
goods or services, might be more useful. In addition it became clearer to all that
action must be focussed on the needs of victims in the stricken areas, on what
they needed to rebuild their lives for the immediate and long term, particularly
in practical terms such as in the building up of local businesses and the local
economy.
The EWWA (EastWest Art Award) art group for example, arranged for profits
from its art exhibition to be spent on art materials rather than just sending the
funds to Japan, with the aim of giving individuals in Tohoku vouchers to obtain
these materials from art shops in the area. Such initiatives help not only those
who receive the art materials, but the businesses who normally sell them. But
caution was needed: sending bikes to Tohoku for example may help the recipi-
ents, but not so helpful for any local business in Tohoku who would normally
have sold bikes.
The Tohoku Earthquake Relief Project (TERP) is a London-based group that
has encouraged the above approach, seeking to act as a platform for introducing
individuals or groups in the UK to projects they may best be suited to help with
in Tohoku. Projects have included the Wallpaper Project, which was set up by
London-based interior designer Noriko Sawayama who provided high-quality
British wallpaper for the temporary housing built for victims. The wallpaper
makes a difference to the quality of life of victims residing in such accommo-
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dation for much longer than was originally anticipated. Several similar projects
have been set up through TERP: A group of Japanese mothers in the UK set up
TheBabyMuslin project which provide squares ofmuslin formothers and babies
or small children in the stricken area; East Loop aims to create business oppor-
tunities within the area by enabling them to sell their own handcrafts for which
they then keep the profits; Seven Beach Aid supports the Seven Beach (Shichi-
gahama) area in Miyagi Prefecture and has organized photographic exhibitions
to show progress in the area; Smile Kids has been working specifically to sup-
port orphanages, and Sono x Nadeshiko was set up by a fashion designer who
collaborates with women in the area to make fashion accessories from kimono
material salvaged from the tsunami.
The approach shown in such projects enables or encourages people-to-people
links between the benefactors and beneficiaries, and most importantly of all en-
ables dialogue between the two to ensure that beneficiaries receive the help they
truly need rather than what benefactors may presume. Such projects demon-
strate communitas between the individuals involved, but require organization
and commitment that can be less easy to maintain over time, especially in view
of the nature of commitment required by transient staff to their posting, which
may be another factor in the waning of the initial ‘disaster spirit’.
Another lesson learnt in this is the importance of feedback. One of the reasons
for public malaise in giving financially was lack of feedback about what had hap-
pened to their donations. The experience of TERP has shown how individuals
who may be able to help fall into different camps: from those who have a ready
made skill; business idea that can be linked to the area (such as in the case of the
wallpaper project); individuals who were keen to help but don’t know what to
do or how, and those who say they are interested but too busy with their daily
commitments. It seems not only important but crucial to tap into all of these and
recognize that each may have a contribution on whatever scale. TERP therefore
organizes renraku kyogi kai (information meetings) and ‘volunteer pub’ – infor-
mal occasions where interested individuals can meet and hear about ongoing
projects and their progress. It also has a Facebook profile and sends out regular
newsletters by email. The target is for 500 readers, accounting for 1/100 Japa-
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nese in UK. So far the newsletters have around 300 readers and the Facebook
page 400 followers.
One point that TERP has discovered in trying to put people’s skills to use is
that it is more helpful if volunteers can come and say, “This is what we can do”
rather than,“What can we do”. Furthermore, while there will be individuals who
have definite skills and connections in Japan they are able to put into action (such
as the wallpaper project), there will be other individuals who, while they would
like to help, don’t know how to, or those whose time is limited to work or family
commitments but would like to help in all ways if they can. Volunteering has
been the subject of research since the Kobe (The Great Hanshin) Earthquake of
1995 or even before, but it may be that Japanese approaches toward charitable
organizations could to be reassessed long with education about the notion of
charity organizations, charitable giving and volunteering in Japan.
5 Youth and Social Media
The role of young people and the way they have gained, developed and employed
skills in charitable organization is a significant factor to emerge from the disaster.
Previously on the periphery of hierarchical social networks in the UK, students
were not only part of the first phase of communitas, they were at times driving
forces of the second phase.
It was young musicians who took initiative from Taro Hakase’s performances
not only to spread word of his appearances and to man collection buckets, but
to follow his example and organize fund raising concerts of their own. Young
musicians studying at London’s music conservatoires were also invited to play at
more elite fund raising events, once again demonstrating a bringing together of
members of the different groups. Young Japanese were key in a number of proac-
tive groups, such as Play For Japan, which brings together young professionals,
students, youngmusicians and artists with the aimof using their skills to raise the
profile of fund raising events and of sustaining awareness of the continuing chal-
lenges being faced in Japan during reconstruction. The organization received
support from the Japanese Embassy of Japan as well as the Japan Foundation
and the Japan Society, showing once more the value of cooperation between all
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three. Other groups include Young- Kai, set up by students studying in London,
who held a candle-lit ceremony on the anniversary of the disaster and a pho-
tographic exhibition called One Second and Action for Japan which organizes
both charity events and volunteer tours to Tohoku for British students.
Young people have been particularly good at employing social networks such
as Facebook, as well as e-mail and the Internet and in a way which some extent
superseded other forms of media such as TV and newspaper coverage. Report-
ing of reactions to the disaster in the UK by the more traditional Japanese media
of television and the press has been aimed at emphasizing support for Japan from
Japanese living in London as well as the host country and promoting the mes-
sage, “You are not alone”. This was seen in reporting of the concerts held by
Takase in the aftermath and in reporting of the event at the Royal Opera House.
Disadvantages of television and press coverage included the inescapable fact
that some projects are more attractive than others for their visual and symbolic
appeal. The ‘Sakura Front’ project for example, received much media attention
since it involved making poppies for remembrance, with half of the sale profits
sent to Tohoku where they were used to plant sakura (cherry blossom) trees. Or-
ganizers of some charitable projects found that the presence of television cam-
eras could bring tensions when individual victims or groups were singled out
and there has been concern that where cameras go in and film, they tend to be
focused on a “good story” and aftercare and other needs of victims are not a
priority.
Reporting by the Britishmedia in theUK gradually decreasedwith time, apart
from regular updates on the nuclear-related concerns at Fukushima. The first
and second anniversaries of the disaster were opportunities for the media to
bring the event back to the attention of the British public. The Japanese Ambas-
sador used the occasion of the first anniversary to publish a full page message
in the Independent on Sunday newspaper. This was headed ‘Arigatou, Eikoku.
Ganbare, Nihon’ (Thank you, UK. Fight on, Tohoku) – a play on words of the
newspaper’s own front page message two days after the disaster, ‘Ganbare, Ni-
hon. Ganbare, Tohoku’ (Don’t give up, Japan. Don’t give up, Tohoku). Both
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messages were also well reported in Japan, once again reflecting the use of more
traditional media as an expression of the message of support .
Forms of social media such as Facebook and Twitter have obvious advantages,
not least immediacy and the ability to reach a wide range of people on an equal
level. Social media has allowed individuals to find out about the ongoing sit-
uation in Tohoku, as well as to be kept informed about fund raising events in
the UK and to publicize them. The use of social networks has led not only to
the inclusion of students in activities for which they may formerly have been on
the periphery, but has meant that they have some control over such activities
themselves. This has been a major contributory factor in breaking down social
hierarchies and in enabling all sections of the Japanese community including
young people to have a voice.
6 The Increasing Role of Permanent Residents
Reactions to the disaster highlight the extent to which Japanese permanent resi-
dents have gradually become established in the UK, perhaps corroborating the
observation ofMarienstras (1989: 125) that the reality of a diaspora is ‘proved in
time and tested by time’.
While the 1960s saw the foundation of Japanese groups aimed mainly at the
transient professional community like the Nippon Club, JCCI (the Japanese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and Eikoku Fujin Kai (Japanese Women’s
Association of Great Britain), an organization for permanent residents was not
formed until some thirty year later in 1991 – the Japanese Residents Association,
which changed its name to Japan Association in 1997, and was registered as a
charity in 2011. The Association reflects the needs of the increasingly long es-
tablished permanent population, especially as they reached retirement age, some
having lived in theUK for up to 50 years as a result of finance andmanufacturing,
and who as already mentioned originally might have been transient profession-
als themselves. It focusses onmutual support, health andwelfare of its members,
for example by visiting those who are sick. Monthly support meetings attract up
to 80 members. Members also maintain a Japanese cemetery, which was first
established in 1936 but fell into disrepair following World War II. The Associ-
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ation arranges lecture meetings, a walking group and the promotion of Anglo-
Japanese understanding and cultural activities.
It is significant that the Japan Association promotes volunteering, charity ac-
tivities and cultural exchange for those living in the UK and that current mem-
bership is not exclusive to Japanese permanent residents of the UK but open to
anyone who speaks Japanese. This expresses inclusivity in contrast to the exclu-
sivity often conveyed by the more elite business transient world, and a break-
ing away from the mould of Japanese traditional corporate life and its etiquette,
while at the same timemaintaining the ability to operate within it. The Residents
Association has also come to understand the value of cooperation with other or-
ganizations, both British and Japanese, such at the Japan Society, JCCI and the
Nippon Club as well as with the Embassy of Japan from whom it has gained re-
spect through its actions – for example in the organization of the matsuri that
has been held for the past three years.
Key members of the Residents Association were particularly involved in this.
Such entrepreneurs who are particularly well connected as a result of their own
business experience in the UK can be highly regarded rather than looked upon
with suspicion as may have been the case in the past, particularly the 1970s and
1980s, when they may have been thought of as “not quite Japanese”. Like those
female “local staff” working in Japanese Banks in the City of London described
by Sakai (2000), permanent residents often become a resource for information
and can be respected by the transient population for their knowledge of life in
the UK and as such, often form a significant bridge between the two cultures.
Permanent residents have come to play such a significant role precisely because
they are not stuck within the confines of the Japanese corporate and diplomatic
world but have experience and understanding of it: they maintain connections
with its members and hold their respect but are able to draw upon both.
Thus while there may have been a view that permanent residents were on the
periphery of the business and diplomatic social world, such residents have come
to play an increasingly important role. While the transient population who help
make up the diaspora come and go (and sometimes come back again) permanent
residents add a permanency to the community entered into and have much to
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teach the wider diaspora community about promoting connections between all
groups that make up the community. They also have the Anglo-Japanese con-
nections that have proved vital in contributing to disaster relief.
7 Responses to the Disaster and Anglo-Japanese Relations
Closely related to the above, responses to the disaster in Japan have also illus-
trated the strength of Anglo-Japanese relations and have further contributed to
them. Strong links between the home and the host nation can be vital in times of
disaster. In terms of diaspora, it is relevant that the UK is a welcoming and toler-
ant host country, one of the characteristics that Cohen suggests as significant in
allowing the possibility of a distinctive, creative and enriching life (Cohen 1997:
180).
Interest in Japan amongst the public was strengthened by two nationwide
Japan Festivals in 1991 and 2002 and evident in the 450 or more events that
took place throughout the entire country in 2008 to mark the 150th anniver-
sary of formal diplomatic relations collectively referred to as ‘JAPAN-UK 150’.
Public interest shown in the Matsuri mentioned above surpassed the organizers’
wildest dreams and support for Japan following the disaster of 2011 came from
all corners of the UK and from all manner of people.
Since diplomatic relations were formalized, personal links that have devel-
oped, especially in the last fifty to sixty years, have also formed an influential
community of friends of Japan that have played an important role in Anglo-
Japanese relations. These are typified by the Japan Society and Nichi-Ei Oto-
modachi Kai, the Anglo-Japanese Friendship Group for the wives of senior Japa-
nese business men andDiplomats who arematched with a Britishmember to act
as friend (otomodachi) during their time in London. The Group was founded in
1961 and over the years some Japanese members have rejoined on second post-
ings to London, while British members develop strong ties with their Japanese
“friends”. Such links have been important in the aftermath of the disaster, for
example in terms of the connections that the Japan Society was able to use in
administering its Relief Fund.
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Strong relations between members of the Royal and Imperial families and the
similarities between the two island nations that make the UK a welcoming host
country have been important in promoting Anglo-Japanese relations and an un-
derstanding of Japan in the UK. There has been a strong tradition of Japanese
princes being educated at Oxford, including the current Crown Prince. The year
following the disaster coincidedwith a British Royal event that further linked the
two countries – celebrations marking sixty years since the coronation of Queen
Elizabeth II, which was attended by the Emperor of Japan as one of only two
living royal family members who had been present at the coronation itself. The
Emperor and Empress arrived in London in May 2012 for a five-day state visit
which was used as an opportunity to thank not only the British people but also
members of the Japanese community, commenting not only on its contribution
to fundraising, but significantly, on its role in building Anglo-Japanese relations
over the years. In this the Emperor acknowledged an important function of di-
aspora communities, especially at times of disaster.
The importance of Anglo-Japanese ties was seen nowhere better than in the
response to the disaster by The Japan Society, which was able to use contacts
built up over time to work closely with the Sanburi Foundation in Sendai in or-
der to best support local relief activity in the region. As of March 14 2012 the
total raised was £ 677,000 from 1600 donors (Japan Society 2012). Although a
British organization, the Society has a Japanese membership and is particularly
generously supported by Japanese corporations in the UK, marking a strong and
essential Japanese involvement. In addition, Japanese women were instrumen-
tal in translating the letters from school children in the school project set up by
the Society following the disaster. Such collaboration between both individuals
and organizations of host and home nation demonstrates the value of Anglo-
Japanese links as a lesson for diaspora communities.
8 Conclusion
The first phase of communitas seen in the aftermath of the disaster was char-
acterized by emotion and by a consequent levelling between members of the
groups that are normally separate and differentiated. The second phase follow-
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ing the initial shock was associated with the desire to do something. Initially this
was reflected in a determination to donate financially or to organize or support
events that were held to raise funds. However, over time there became a wider
understanding that, though such funds were essential in the aftermath, a differ-
ent approach was needed for the long term recovery of the local economy and
that the needs of victims themselves needed to be heard. Along with the return
to the normality of daily life in London this contributed to a natural dissolution
of the original enthusiasm as members of each group returned to the roles that
define their very existence as part of the Japanese diaspora in the UK.
In this way, the aftermath of the disaster has perhaps shown that the existence
of groupswithin the community of Japanese can have bothmerit and purpose. In
the sense that social networks can have value (Putnam 1995), their organization
may be said to have social capital. The diplomatic and practical function of the
Embassy, for example, has been vital. In addition to the functions mentioned,
the Ambassador used the occasions of ceremonies of remembrance hosted at
the Embassy one and two years after the tragedy as an opportunity to raise the
issue of the EuropeanUnion’s blanket restrictions on imports from Japan, to pro-
mote the produce of Tohoku and the safety of travel to the area. Conveying such
messages was an important diplomatic role of the Embassy, and yet in terms of
effective responses in the aftermath, diplomatic staff did not act alone.
Side by side with the diplomatic community, the business community played
its own vital role, particularly in terms of  being in a position to make large fi-
nancial donations, and through their sponsorship of the Japan Society they sup-
ported the Japan Society Relief Fund with its focus on the work of NPOs. Sim-
ilarly, the contribution of students and permanent residents is also clear: this
chapter has shown how students and permanent residents normally on the pe-
riphery of social networks can not only be drawn into spirit of communitas fol-
lowing disaster, but they can also become a driving force of it. The use of social
media not only facilitated their inclusion, but gave them a considerable amount
of control over it.
Students and permanent residents can perhaps become driving forces pre-
cisely because they are not limited by restrictions found in other hierarchical so-
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cial groups, and yet at the same time, the connections found within these groups
can be essential in getting things done, thereby paradoxically reenforcing their
existence. The musicians and performers who were instrumental in providing
the platform for other Japanese to express solidaritywere high profile themselves,
already known and with ready-made connections in business or diplomatic cir-
cles. It was Takase’s celebrity status that enabled him to arrange the series of
performances at short notice at a time when fellow Japanese in London did not
know how to express their emotion or know what to do. Paradoxically, rather
than being broken down as the initial phase of apparent communitasmight have
suggested, the hierarchical system was perhaps as important as ever.
Responses to the disaster have shown how permanent residents have become
more established in the UK, perhaps justifying the term diaspora, and how they
too can play a vital role within it. Permanent residents maintain the very per-
manence of the community into which transient professional and their families
enter and at times of disaster this permanence can have particular value. They
are not merely focussed on their professional roles but can have a wider outlook
and play important parts in bridging between the host and the home nation and
its transient professionals. This has been seen in the support given by certain
permanent residents – especially in the Residents Association – to the Japan So-
ciety and in arranging events like the Matsuri, which involves cooperation not
just with the Japan Society but with organizations for the transient corporate
world (such as JCCI and the Nippon Club).
The value of good relations with the host country built up over time is also
demonstrated, especially on the personal level. In setting up its Relief Fund, the
Japan Society was able to use the personal connections built up over the years.
Such connections can be vital and can also reinforce the conventional hierarchi-
cal system.
Following the initial fervor to donate money and to organize or attend char-
ity events the experience of organizations such as TERP seems to suggest a gap
between attitudes towards charity in the UK and Japan. Whereas many British
charitable organizations are well managed, even with potential political influ-
ence, there tends to be a different view to charitable giving in Japan. Volun-
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teering at the local level is well established in Japan, such as in neighborhood
organizations and PTAs (Parent Teacher Associations) at schools. However, the
experience of students in becoming involved in organized charitable work in the
UK as a result of the disaster may have provided lessons amongst a younger po-
tentially influential generation. The skills learnt in the aftermathmay be usefully
employed in changing attitudes and in understanding of sustained charitable giv-
ing and of charitable administration that may help both affected areas long term
as well as future disaster response planning.
Since diplomatic relations were formalized, personal links – especially at the
corporate and diplomatic level including those amongst members of the Japan
Society andNichi-Ei Otomodachi Kai – have formed an influential community of
friends of Japan that have played an important role in Anglo-Japanese relations.
These, along with the similarities between the two nations that make the UK
a welcoming host country, have been important in promoting Anglo-Japanese
relations and an understanding of Japan in theUK. Responses shown in the after-
math of the disaster of 2011 demonstrate the strength of these relations, building
on the 150 years of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy that, along with the nature of the
global economy, facilitated the Japanese presence in theUK in the first place, and
prove the durability of the Japanese diaspora in the UK, simultaneously demon-
strating the value of diaspora communities in times of disaster.
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The Triple Disaster as an Opportunity
to Feel Japanese Again in Hawaii
Jutta Teuwsen
1 Introduction
This paper will analyze the effect of the 3/11 Triple Disaster on the process of
identity formation of Japanese Americans living in Hawaii. Of all Japanese dias-
poras, Hawaii’s has a special significance because in relation to the overall pop-
ulation, its Japanese American population is larger than all other Japanese di-
asporas abroad. Historically, Hawaii was one of the first destinations to where
large groups of Japanese workers migrated during the late nineteenth century.
During a fieldwork project focusing on the Japanese department store Shi-
rokiya between August and November 2011, I realized that the construction of a
specific Japanese identity in Hawaii was in a period of transition and that 3/11
played an important part in this ongoing process. In interviews conducted with
nisei and sansei, it became evident that not only their feelings of identity and
their understanding of and dealing with their Japanese heritage was influenced
by this overseas catastrophe, but also the social conditions for Japanese Amer-
icans in Hawaii have been changing since the disaster.
In order to understand what effect 3/11 had on the status of the Japanese
Americans in Hawaii and how these changes can be explained, this paper will
give attention to five aspects. First, I will give a brief overview of the Japanese
American population in Hawaii as it is today. Second, I will focus on the history
of Japanese immigration to Hawaii, followed by an analysis of the social status
of the Japanese American diaspora and then the reaction of the Hawaiian popu-
lation on 3/11. This paper ends with a short outlook on the future of Japanese
Americans in Hawaii after 2011.
2 Japanese American Hawaii
According to the 2010 US census, nearly 23 percent of Hawaii’s population
claimed to be Japanese or Japanese in combination with at least one other race.
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Of these, more than 185,000 – almost two-thirds – claimed to be only Japanese,
which is 13.69 percent of Hawaii’s total population. It is striking that even af-
ter five generations, gosei1 still claim to be Japanese. Even now, the majority of
nisei does not speak Japanese fluently, perhaps because their parents’ genera-
tion, the issei, had to endure growing nationalistic sentiments in the US after
World War I, and as a result learned to adjust to the English language (Kimura
1988: 185). Therefore, even if their parents were native Japanese speakers, sub-
sequent generations spoke Pidgin English, which evolved as a major language
on the plantations where the majority of Japanese immigrant laborers worked.
For the nisei generation, it meant that they grew up in an English-language envi-
ronment; thus, English became their first language. If these second generation
Japanese studied Japanese at all, they learned it as a second language in Japanese
language schools. However, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on De-
cember 7, 1941, the Japanese language schools closed down and the public use
of Japanese language was even prohibited because, in a socio-political context,
Americans of Japanese descent were suspected to be secretly working for their
mother country (Kimura 1988: 225; Odo 2003: 101–116). Only in 1947 did
some of the Japanese language schools reopen, but by then the nisei generation
had hardly spoken Japanese for many years (Kimura 1988: 254). Thus, while the
majority of the nisei might have or have had only basic knowledge of the Japa-
nese language, the following generations generally do not speak or understand
Japanese.
The situation for the Japanese Americans in Hawaii, therefore, differs signif-
icantly from the typical transient Japanese experience elsewhere in the world.
Many Japanese live only temporarily in London, Brussels, Dusseldorf and Paris.
They are dispatched by their companies and accompanied by their families but
will return to Japan after a few years abroad. In contrast, people of Japanese ori-
gin in North and South America and in Hawaii can often trace the moment of
their families’ immigration back four or five generations. Accordingly, they see
themselves as Americans with a Japanese background. Many are born in the US
with English as their native language. Japan is certainly a popular destination for
1 Gosei are fifth-generation Japanese.
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tourists and a place that is somehow connected to nostalgic feelings forHawaiian
Japanese Americans, but they still consider their homeland to be Hawaii – that
is, the US. However, there is also a minority that rather fits to the description of
a transient diasporic community. This group consists of individuals coming to
Hawaii for a certain period of time, going back to Japan after one or two years. In
general they are surfing teachers or occupy other jobs related to Hawaii’s tourist
industry that significantly depends on Japanese tourists. However, the majority
of individuals with Japanese background are descendants of the Japanese immi-
grants from around 1900.
3 History of Japanese Immigration to Hawaii
In 1868, year one of theMeiji-period, the first group of 148 Japanesemenwent to
Hawaii to work on the sugar plantations. These Gannen-mono (Meiji first-year
people) mark the beginning of Japanese diaspora (Befu 2001: 3–22; Danniels
2006: 31). The Japanese workers came to Hawaii on a three-year contract. Ini-
tially, all migrant workers intended to return home after having earned sufficient
money. They had the plan to take the money back home to Japan and have a
better life with their families (Befu 2010: 34). However, due to bad working
conditions, some of the workers went home even before their contracts ended,
and only 90 gannen-mono decided to settle down in Hawaii (Kimura 1988: 3).
After successful negotiations regarding changes to working conditions and the
improvement of contracts, Japanese immigration increased and more migrant
workers settled down in Hawaii and stayed for good. By 1898, more than 16,000
Japanese were living in Hawaii (Kimura 1988: 13). In the same year, Hawaii be-
came a territory of theUS, this had significant effects on the Japanese immigrants
to Hawaii. As one consequence, Japanese no longer had to find contracts with
sugar plantations in order to be allowed to migrate to Hawaii. Between 1900
and 1907, more than 68,000 Japanese went to Hawaii; not all of them stayed,
and more than 35,000 Japanese left for the west coast of the US, drawn by the
expectation of higher wages (Kimura 1988: 13–15). Due to the high numbers of
Japanese immigrants, an informal “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was arranged be-
tween the US and Japan in 1907/08 (Sawada 1991: 339–359). From that time
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forward, Japan restricted passports, issuing them only to close kin and “picture
brides” of those Japanese already living in theUS.2 Finally, in 1924, a clause of the
US Immigration Act completely barred Japanese immigration and led to strong
tensions between the Japanese government and the US and also sparked weak
movement albeit Japanese Americans aimed for the revision of the Act (Hirobe
2002). In that year, 125,368 Japanese were living in Hawaii. After immigration
was legalized again, Hawaii returned to its status as a popular destination for
Japanese immigrants. Even today, the Japanese American population remains
one of the largest “racial” groups in Hawaii according to the 2010 census (US
Census Bureau 2010).
4 The Social Status of Japanese Americans in Hawaii
The outlined historical circumstances indicate why we cannot compare the Ja-
panese American diaspora of Hawaii with transient diasporas in Europe. The
Japanese are an integral part of the overall population of Hawaii and see them-
selves as locals. The term “local” is to some extent opposed to what is generally
understood as “diaspora”: “local” represents the shared identity of all Hawaiian
people who have an appreciation and commitment to the islands, people and
way of life. Being local in Hawaii is inclusive – local people can be of Japanese,
Chinese, Portuguese or any other ancestry. They are local first and foremost. Fi-
nally, being local is not about one’s heritage but about presence; it is about living
in Hawaii right now, which suggests that Hawaii’s Japanese Americans deal with
their history of immigration in a different way compared to other Japanese dias-
poric communities. However, there are also historical reasons why this group
does not publicly demonstrate its Japanese background. Over time, the image of
the Japanese American population changed continuously.
In 1909 and 1920, the Japanese on the sugar plantations went on strike for
better working conditions. The Filipino Labor Union initiated the second strike
in 1920 (Duus 1999). However, the Japanese workers joined belatedly, and union
2 Picture brides were Japanese women sent from Japan to Hawaii in order to enter into an arranged
marriage. The practice got started when the immigrants realized that they could not accumulate
enough money to go back to Japan soon trough their work (Yun Chai 1988). The future husbands
had nothing but a picture, waiting for the brides to arrive at the harbor.
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leaders on both sides mistrusted each other and diverged on the general aims of
the strike (Pierce 2007: 577). These strikes were only partly successful and lead
to a deep resentment towards the Japanese by groups of workers. As a result,
many Japanese left the cane fields. The number of Japanese who worked on the
fields declined only from 1930 onwards, and those who remained increasingly
occupied minor positions of responsibility, like field overseers (Kimura 1988:
100f.). As a result, both working and living conditions improved noticeably, and
the nisei born around 1930 did not experience the constraints of the earlier years.
While the conditions on the cane fields improved and increasing numbers of
issei advanced to positions with more responsibility, a solid base for the follow-
ing Japanese American generation was built: major institutions and organiza-
tions had been established and took root, like the United Japanese Society in
1932, and Japanese vernacular newspapers were widely spread (Kimura 1988:
178f.) The political, economic and social influence of the Japanese American
population inHawaii grew andmore andmore parents could afford to send their
children to colleges on the US mainland. The results are still visible today – as
a group, Japanese Americans are socioeconomically very successful (Okamura
2008: 127).
Japanese Americans in Hawaii occupy influential administrative, professional
and clerical occupations on all state levels and are highly visible. However, from
the 1970s onwards, this visibility gradually evolved into a negative stereotype
and the Japanese American communities were resented because of their suc-
cess. Furthermore, the Japanese became the scapegoats for social and economic
problems. As a consequence, this group refrained from stressing their Japanese
identity and instead focused on their local identity.
Because the Japanese American community tended to hold back their ethnic
background, it is promising to analyze the groups’ reaction following the triple
disaster. During my field research in Hawaii, I interviewed a number of Japa-
nese Americans, especially those with ties to the prefecture of Fukushima and
also approached the Japanese Cultural Center of Hawaii and the Ethnic Studies
Department of the University of Hawaii. The impression I got from my inter-
views seemed to be in line with the opinions of the experts: The “public denial”
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of a Japanese heritage did neither result in a much less visible reaction by the
Japanese communities towards 3/11 compared to other diasporic communities
nor in a highly visible reaction. Their reaction did not differ from other Japanese
American groups in Hawaii. And they did not play a key role in promoting the
visibility of the Japanese American communities after 3/11. To sum it up, the re-
action towards 3/11 was intense through all social strata and local communities
in Hawaii and unrelated to ethnic background or geographical descent in Japan.
5 Reactions On 3/11
Following the 3/11 catastrophe, there have been beneficial events and donations
as well as other activities. Furthermore, the overall presence of the incident –
as well as the presence of Japanese Americans – in the media has been strik-
ing. It is remarkable to what extent the triple disaster dominates the economical
and political sections in Hawaii’s local newspapers from 2011. In that respect,
Hawaii is probably not different from other places because people all over the
world showed their interest and compassion for Japan and the Japanese. How-
ever, the triple catastrophe also dominated local news. The Japanese Cultural
Center of Hawaii initiated many benefit events, and the Japan-America Society
of Hawaii started a great part of the fund raising. Likewise, local organizations
were and are still engaged in aiding Japan. The Aloha for Japan initiative in-
volves more than 160 Hawaiian financial institutions, merchants, schools and
community groups. Because Hawaii depends significantly on Japanese tourism,
companies like Hawaiian Airlines and major hotel groups also felt the need to
show their support through financial donations for aid and reconstruction.
Many Hawaiians participated in events and donated individually. One exam-
ple of an event is the Lei Day for Japan. A lei is a Hawaiian necklace made of
flowers. Respected individuals and guests are honored by receiving a lei, which
is a crucial element in many festivities. The lei is strongly connected to the con-
cept of friendship and is supposed to foster feelings of belonging. Since 1928, Lei
Day has been a national holiday, and Steven J. Friesen has pointed out how the
lei as well as Lei Days have contributed to the construction of an ethnic identity
on the Hawaiian islands (Friesen 1996: 1–36). This festival is celebrated on May
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1, and in 2011 it was turned into the Lei Day for Japan by Hawaian Airlines. The
airline organized a music and cuisine benefit event held at the very prominent
Aloha Tower Marketplace in Honolulu; the benefit raised more than $ 200,000.
Finally, the numbers provided by the American Red Cross Hawaii State Chap-
ter are most telling: The people of Hawaii, with a population of not more than
about 1.3 million people, raised over six million dollars to aid the Japan relief
effort. Many schools, NGOs, companies and individuals made donations rang-
ing from $ 1 to $ 50,000. Examples of fund-raising activities include car washes,
bake sales and a telethon with a concert held on the lawn of the Hilton Hawaiian
Village; here performers donated their time and talent while people from around
theworldwatched on television and/or via computers andmade donations to the
Red Cross online as well as by phone. A group of companies and banks worked
together with the Hawaiian Red Cross and Japan American Society of Hawaii to
coordinate efforts on all islands.
Iwould like to stress that theHawaiian populationdonated significantly higher
amounts of money to the victims of 3/11 than they had ever donated before for
other catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina or 9/11. During the first two weeks
after the earthquake, the American Red Cross Hawaii State Chapter received
more than $ 640,000 from Hawaiian residents, which was more than triple the
$ 190,000 sum that was donated two weeks after the Haiti earthquake.
The generosity of the Hawaiian population can be traced back to four reasons.
The first reason is that both islands, Hawaii and Japan, were threatened by the
same tsunami. It hit Japan worst, but the Hawaiian people are highly aware of
the fact that it could have happened to them. This feeling was intensified by a
historical precedence: in 1960, a massive earthquake close to the coast of Chile
(magnitude 9.5), which was actually the strongest recorded earthquake in the
twentieth century, led to a tsunami that traveled around half the globe. It first
hit Hawaii, after crossing 10,000 km of the Pacific, and killed 61 people. How-
ever, the tsunami did not stop inHawaii and reached the coast of Tōhoku, the site
of the triple catastrophe in 2011, eight hours later. Government officials as well
as the general population in Japan did not expect that the tsunami would still be
powerful enough to cause damagewhen reaching the shore andwere thus unpre-
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pared. Although the news had broadcast that Hawaii had been hit by a tsunami,
no official warning was released for the Eastern Coast of Japan (Yoshimura 2004:
156). When the tsunami finally reached Japanese shores, it killed another 161
people.
Thus, Hawaiian people in 2011 took a highly empathetic position because they
could easily imagine that they could have experienced a similar scenario. Nev-
ertheless, the tsunami of 2011 caused $ 22million in property damage in Hawaii
and forced the closure of two hotels. For Japanese Americans, being reminded
of the Great Hanshin earthquake of 1995 might even have led to a flashback ex-
perience because they felt personally involved through their Japanese heritage,
and as a result, they reacted with even more empathy.
The second, and probably more influential reason for the high amount of do-
nations given by the Hawaiian people is that the Japanese Americans consti-
tute such a high percentage of the overall population, which means that they
are present and influence or affect all socio-economic spheres. This presence
of the Japanese Americans, although they refrained from publicly showcasing
their Japanese American identity, is still highly visible all over the island. There
are Japanese restaurants, and green tea drinks and matcha ice cream (green tea
ice cream) are available throughout the islands. The major Japanese department
store Shirokiya defends a very prominent spot at the country’s biggest shopping
center: the Ala Moana Center in Honolulu. It was to be closed several times, but
different interest groups are still fighting to keep it open. The crucial aspect is
that things “Japanese” are considered to be a significant characteristic of Hawaii
for all local people – independent from their ethnic background. Even if the
perception of the Japanese Americans might be judged positively or negatively,
they are in fact a part of the locals’ everyday life. Thus, 3/11 affected not only the
Japanese American communities but also each and every individual claiming to
be local.
Third, the constant and visible presence of tourists from Japan also ought to
be seen as a significant reason for the contributions of local communities. Most
of the local communities are aware of the fact that Japanese tourism is one of
the major pillars of the prosperous local economy. Of all tourists, 17.3 percent
92
The Triple Disaster as an Opportunity to Feel Japanese Again in Hawaii
who came by air in 2011 came from Japan. Nearly two million Japanese fly to
Hawaii every year. Japanese tourists spend the most per day, averaging $ 289
whereas the average amount of money spent per day by tourists is only $ 179.
Contributions to the relief efforts are therefore important to reciprocate the Ja-
panese tourists’ generosity. Furthermore, the donations make sure that the pos-
itive image Japan has of Hawaii will remain at the same high level and uphold a
continuous stream of Japanese tourism to Hawaii. It is certainly not by accident
that Hawaiian Airlines was keen to organize the Lei Day for Japan.
Finally, the high amount of individual funding can be traced back to the long
tradition of gift giving and reciprocity of local groups in Hawaii. Colleen Leahy
Johnson analyzes the reasons for this practice in the case of Japanese Americans
in Honolulu (Johnson 1974: 295–308). She claims that gift giving aims at keep-
ing a balanced reciprocity, serving all essential social functions. In detail, she
differentiates four means of gift giving to support and promote social functions:
“facilitating status placement, providing general continuities, reducing conflict,
and equalizing class difference” (Johnson 1974: 295). The reciprocity of indi-
vidual funding after 3/11 might point to an acknowledgement of what Japanese
Hawaiians and tourists have done for Hawaii. Donors certainly could not have
expected direct reciprocal returns for their support after 3/11.
6 The Future of Japanese Americans in Hawaii after 2011
As argued earlier, the status of the Japanese American community has changed
during the last decades. Japanese Americans did not promote their ethnic iden-
tity actively because they were resented due to their success. They were used to
being made responsible for social and economic problems, but conditions have
significantly changed since the 3/11 catastrophe. The negative perceptions of the
Japanese American communities by other locals appeared to be obsolete because
the triple disaster was the first thing that came on the locals’ mind in the con-
text of Japan or anything Japanese. A complex construct of prejudice, experience
and shared history with the Japanese Americans had evolved overmore than one
decade, but it seems that it was reset in one day. After decades of holding back
their Japanese heritage, 3/11 allowed Japanese Americans to show their heritage
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freely and openly again. Apart from their local immersion, now they are again
placed in the context of the homeland of their acclaimed ancestors.
To conclude, 3/11 has brought about significant changes in the self-image as
well as in the perception of the Japanese American communities of Hawaii. It
will be interesting to see how this new setting will influence the future image
and self-image of the Japanese American groups. As time goes by, former and
well-known structures of behavior and perception might find their way back;
nevertheless, there is a chance that the new setting might persist.
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Disaster, Donations, and Diaspora:
The Response of the Japanese-Brazilian Community
of São Paulo to the Triple Disaster of 2011
Peter Bernardi
The triple disaster or 3/11, the devastating combination of earthquake, tsunami
and the meltdown of reactors at the nuclear power plant Fukushima Daiichi
that happened in Japan on March 11, 2011, was a globally reported catastrophe.
The Japanese diasporic communities especially demonstrated their willingness
to help, organize campaigns and send donations. While a commitment to restor-
ing and relating to the homeland in some way confirms William Safran’s (1991:
84) initial criteria for diasporas, the study of the Japanese diasporic communi-
ties’ response to 3/11 also offers insights into these communities and their status.
This paper offers an analysis of the impact of 3/11 drawn from the reaction of
the Japanese-Brazilian diaspora in São Paulo. Although initiatives to help Japan
were started throughout Brazil, São Paulo hosts the largest and most influential
nikkei community that organized the biggest campaigns. Furthermore, the ar-
ticle is my attempt to relate observed connections between disaster, donations
and diaspora. I had originally scheduled fieldwork on Japanese immigration for
March 2011, but after arriving in Brazil on March 12, reactions to the catas-
trophes of 3/11 were a constant topic in many encounters and overlapped my
intended research on the nikkei community of São Paulo. Donations played an
important role, and in this article I argue that help (especially financial) after 3/11
was not only about Japan but also the self-perception of the nikkei community in
São Paulo. By donating and participating in the campaigns, Japanese-Brazilians
were able to perform their identity as “Japanese” for the community itself, for
the Brazilian society, and also for representatives of official Japan. To provide
some background, a short overview over the nikkei community in São Paulo is
followed by a historic focus on two previous initiatives for helping Japan. After
reporting about the general response inBrazil to the catastrophes, the article then
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concentrates on São Paulo and presents howmain actors reacted, how campaigns
were perceived in the community, and which implications can be deduced.
1 Japanese Diaspora in Brazil
Brazil ranks first among the worldwide Japanese diasporas, counting more than
1.5 million Japanese and those with a Japanese heritage. Historically, Japanese
immigrants were sent to Brazil in 1908 in order to work on coffee plantations
and balance labor shortages after the abolishment of slavery in the late 19th cen-
tury. Economic success came through individual and cooperative farming, along
with a transition to urban areas and white-collar jobs. Today, many descendants
of these settlers have gained considerable economic wealth and are seen as a
“respected and highly educated immigrant group” (Brody 2002: 49). A dispro-
portionally number of nikkei are not only students but also educators at schools
and universities (Adachi 2004: 63). They have achieved political success as city
councilmen, delegates and even ministers in different political administrations
(Harada 2010). Among scholars, Japanese immigrants to Brazil and their de-
scendants are therefore considered to be a “positive” or even highly integrated
“modelminority” (Adachi 2006: 12). In Brazilian society, the nikkei retain a pos-
itive (yet stereotypical) image and are often referred to as “Japanese” whose con-
tinued connection to Japan, their former homeland, is strongly assumed (Lesser
2007: 150). The nikkei’s relationship with Japan has become more contentious
since the 1990s, when the Japanese government changed immigration policies
to attract foreign workers with Japanese ancestry. Especially Brazilian nikkei
have gone to Japan to work in mainly blue-collar jobs and have settled there,
even though they experience a stark contrast of their perception as undesirable
foreigners. These workers-away-from-home or dekasegi now form the country’s
third largest minority, suffering from both discrimination and the effects of a
declining economy (Reis 2002; Brody 2002).
In Brazil, amajority ofnikkei live andwork in the state of São Paulo and its cap-
ital, the city of São Paulo, where they have formed a visible community. The dis-
trict of Liberdade is known as the “Oriental” or “Japanese district” becausemany
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Japanese immigrants once lived and established businesses here.1 Liberdade is
also home to the main actors in the nikkei community of São Paulo, e. g.: its
central entity, the association Sociedade Brasileira de Cultura Japonesa e de As-
sistência Social (burajiru nihon bunka fukushi kyōkai, abbreviated as “Bunkyo”),
most prefectural associations (kenjinkai), and various other organizations. Apart
from these official institutions, the daily Japanese-language newspapers SãoPaulo
Shimbun andNikkey Shimbun and their Portuguese counterpart, the weekly Jor-
nal Nippak, a Buddhist temple, restaurants serving sushi, sashimi and ramen,
Japanese convenience and specialty stores, and even banks attending customers
in Japanese can be found in Liberdade.
With this concentration of formal and informal venues, Liberdade was a cen-
ter of action and reaction in São Paulo after the catastrophe ofMarch 2011. In the
main plaza next to a bank styled after amedieval Japanese castle, gatherings were
held and donations collected. Newspaper reports were posted in the offices of
various kenjinkai where people from the prefectures met to communicate, mak-
ing these offices hubs for gathering and distributing information as well as for
coordinating help for Japan. Private initiatives appeared throughout the district
and offered opportunities to voice feelings of grief and solidarity. One exam-
ple often referred to in the media was the café Kōhī whose nikkei staff started a
campaign not only to collect money but also to provide moral support. Guests
were asked to leave messages or sign a twelve-meter long poster afterwards sent
to Japan in cooperation with the dekasegi ofMiyagi prefecture. Social media net-
works such as Orkut, the Brazilian equivalent to Facebook, were used to gather
support and promote campaigns like Gambare Japão whose aim was to produce
videomessages in which Brazilians and Japanese-Brazilians alike expressed their
wishes for a speedy recovery, ending with the phrase Gambare Japão. Other ex-
amples included a mass with the participation of Protestant, Catholic and Bud-
dhist priests in the central auditorium of Bunkyo, fund-raising events such as
dinners organized by Japanese-Brazilian chefs in São Paulo’s city hall, concerts by
the state’s symphony orchestra, and art expositions. Labeling of these events ei-
1 Even though this name refers the visible presence of both Japanese, Chinese and Korean immi-
grants and their descendants, nowadays, the latter form a majority of the residents.
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ther gave mixed-language statements in Japanese and Portuguese, such as Gam-
bare Japão and Nippon Ganbare, or implicitly called for help with titles such as
SOS Japão or EveryoneUnited for Japan. Thismultitude of campaigns and events
show that the catastrophes of 3/11 were very visible moments. Various actors or-
ganized the help for Japan and the various campaigns were not only reported in
the media specifically used and produced by Japanese and Japanese-Brazilians
but also gained attention in other newspapers and television programs. How-
ever, the fact that the Japanese diaspora of Brazil helped Japan after a natural
disaster is by no means a new phenomenon. By linking the events of 2011 to
other occasions, conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between Japan
and Japanese descendants abroad.
2 Helping Japan
The relationship to Japan, especially in times of crisis, was always a topic among
Brazilian nikkei. One of the earliest efforts took place in 1947. During the Sec-
ond World War, the Brazilian state sided with the Allied Powers and especially
discriminated against Japanese – as well as German and Italian – immigrants as
a suspected fifth column. After Japan’s surrender, the Japanese community in
Brazil was sharply divided between two groups. Those who believed that Japan
had actually won the war (kachigumi) defended their view, sometimes with orga-
nized terrorist attacks, against the minority that accepted the defeat (makegumi)
(Adachi 2004: 59). Only after the Brazilian state and Japan finally intervened in
the early 1950s was this situation resolved – but at the cost of a confused commu-
nity. In 1947, a group of Japanese immigrants in São Paulo founded the Com-
mittee to Help the Victims of theWar in Japan (Comitê de Socorro ás Vítimas da
Guerra no Japão) and organized donations to post-war Japan. The committee
acted with the support of the Brazilian Red Cross and worked together with the
American occupiers, sending goods and CARE packages worth about $ 15,000
to Japan until July 1950 (Handa 1987: 743). Apart from providing help to the
immigrants’ homeland, the committee was also considered to be an institution
that might help to unite the divided immigrants through a common cause. But
themakegumi group’s cooperation with the Americans, a former enemy, intensi-
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fied the conflict between kachigumi andmakegumi groups. Because only a small
number of the immigrants participated and the project met massive resistance
from the kachigumi groups, the campaign failed in this larger goal of uniting the
immigrants (Beltrão 2008: 257).
The last event that involved Brazilian nikkei in efforts to help Japan was the
earthquake of 1995 that devastated Kōbe city and southern parts of Hyōgo pre-
fecture. It claimed about six thousand lives, the majority of them inhabitants
of Kōbe. With an estimated five thousand Brazilian nikkei living in Hyōgo pre-
fecture and about one thousand in Kobe itself, the community in Brazil tried
desperately to contact friends or family in Japan (Takezawa 2002: 313). Uncer-
tainty continued with rarely-working telephone lines and delayed official infor-
mation until the Japanese government confirmed the first Brazilian nikkei vic-
tim. Of 173 foreign victims counted, eight were Brazilian nikkei (Takezawa 2002:
315). The nikkei media in Brazil widely reported their fates and also the stories
of those who were injured or had lost their belongings or housing (São Paulo
Shimbun 1995a). These very personal links to the disaster directly involved and
affected the community. Various actors as the kenjinkai of Hyōgo province or
Bunkyo met, and although they started individual campaigns for material and
moral support, no organization assumed responsibility for a joint campaign (São
Paulo Shimbun 1995b). Financial donations were individually collected and
likewise distributed; the Hyōgo dekasegi transferred its donations directly to the
government of Hyōgo prefecture itself (São Paulo Shimbun 1995c: 1). This indi-
vidualization of donations was also present in the campaign of Banespa Bank,
one of the biggest Brazilian banks with branches in Japan. Banespa started the
S.O.S. Japão campaign, the donations of which were to be used to support Brazil-
ian NGOs that helped especially Brazilian dekasegi and Brazilian victims of the
earthquake (São Paulo Shimbun 1995d: 4). In total, Brazilian nikkei contribu-
tions to the affected prefectures were estimated at $ 820,000 (Takazawa 2002:
316).
We can consider both reactions in 1947 and 1995 to be a form of solidarity in
which the group that received help was clearly identified as one’s own. Helping
in 1947 meant helping a Japan that the immigrants felt an allegiance to and had
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until recently called their homeland. In 1995, this relationship had changed and
help also targeted various compatriots from Brazil and those who were, in turn,
helping them. The example of Kobe displays a more heterogeneous direction
of help. The catastrophes of 3/11 show different perspectives on help from a
diasporic community.
3 Reactions to 3/11 in Brazil
The Japanese government requested and received international assistance after
the catastrophes of 3/11. Countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and
South Korea dispatched earthquake rescue teams. Others sent relief goods, food,
blankets, and emergency lamps, with the majority of goods coming from China
and the United States of America (Okada et al. 2011: 39). The Japanese govern-
ment of Prime Minister Naoto Kan also received various offers of further help
and decided that all financial help after the catastrophe was to be given to the
Japanese Red Cross. Worldwide, more than one billon dollars were collected by
April 3 (Okada et al. 2011: 39). Fund-raising was therefore a strong focus in
many diasporic communities.
On a national level in Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff immediately sent an
official note to Prime Minister Kan. While President Rousseff expressed her
condolences and Brazil’s readiness to participate in international efforts to help
Japan, she also specifically mentioned the special connection to the Brazilian
nationals living in Japan (Blog do Planalto 2011). As one of the first officials,
Brazilian Minister of External Relations Antonio Patriota called his Japanese
colleague Takeaki Matsumoto to express his condolences and Brazil’s solidar-
ity. The Brazilian government followed with a donation of $ 500,000, which it
transferred to the Japanese Red Cross, conforming to the wishes of the Japanese
government (São Paulo Shimbun 2011a).
Reactions among the nikkei community in São Paulo can be divided into two
phases: a shorter state of shock and confusion followed by an active and longer
phase of organizing concrete help. After Brazilian television broadcasted the pic-
tures of earthquake and tsunami, many tried to contact friends or family mem-
bers working in Japan. As one of my contacts in the field mentioned, the Brazil-
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ian media in these first days visited many associations of the community and
reported emotional stories of missing relatives and their fates. But these stories
soon diminished because in stark contrast to the catastrophe of Kobe in 1995,
no Brazilian nikkei lost his or her life during 3/11.2
A quote from a representative of a nikkei NGO in the weekly Jornal Nippak
sums up the second phase in a nutshell: “What the Japanese need now is moral
support and financial help” (Shiguti 2011a).3 Immediately after the earthquake,
leaders of influential Japanese-Brazilian associations met in Liberdade to coor-
dinate a joint response. The aforementioned Bunkyo, the federation of the pre-
fectural associations (kenren), the philanthropical Beneficência Nipo-Brasileira
de São Paulo (Enkyo), the cultural associationAliança Cultural Brasil-Japão, and
the Chamber of Japanese Commerce and Industry in Brazil decided to launch a
combined campaign to collect donations; the campaign was formally named the
Campaign to Collect for the Victims of the Earthquake in Japan. The organizers
created four different bank accounts for donations. In the beginning, they did
not decide exactly who should receive these donations, but on March 22, the
committee announced that all donations would be transferred to the Japanese
Red Cross, adding that city- and state-wide responses were promising (Abe-Oi
2011c). The campaign raisedmore than 3.2million Reais, about onemillion dol-
lars, in the initial ten weeks (Abe-Oi 2011e). In addition to participation from
actors in São Paulo city, many Japanese associations in the interior of São Paulo
state submitted substantial donations ranging from about $ 1,000 to $ 5,000. The
campaign also counted small donations from unidentified donors, supposedly
Brazilians without Japanese ancestry. This was a huge effort for the community
and its members. Bunkyo was the organization that made this process public
by presenting donors and their reasons to participate on their homepage. The
organizing committee also communicated the amount of donations in weekly
press conferences, although they had agreed not to communicate the amount of
each one’s collection.
2 Interestingly enough,media in Brazil concentratedmore on the dimensions of the natural disasters
of earthquake and tsunami while in contrast, German media reporting put its main focus on the
efforts to control the nuclear power plant.
3 All translations of Portuguese sources are from the author.
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The keyword in this campaign was “solidarity” (solidariedade), but its inter-
pretations were ambiguous. As an idea, solidarity in Brazil has not only been
linked to Christian and socialist ideals but also was fixed in 1988 as a fundamen-
tal principle of Brazil’s constitution (Rosso 2007: 206). Definitions of the word
connect it to a humanitarian idea of helping “those unprotected, those who suf-
fer, the unjust treated” with an “intent to comfort, console and offer help” yet
limits it to a specific group that shares “common attitudes and sentiments [...] to
form a strong unit” (Houaiss 2001: 2602). In the early immigrant nikkei com-
munity, solidarity was also strong principle for mutual help (Handa 1987: 771).
This complex interpretation manifested in the “messages of solidarity” re-
leased by the organizing committee to different audiences: to the Japanese gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Kan and to the nikkei in Japan and Brazil. All mes-
sages published on Bunkyo’s homepage drew heavily on the term “solidarity”
and expressed the intent to help, but their focuses were different. The message
in Portuguese and Japanese addressed Prime Minister Kan “in the name of the
Japanese-Brazilian community” and established the status of the signees as rep-
resentatives of the community who acknowledge and praise political initiatives
of Kan’s government. The organizing committee announced that the community
“was studying possible ways of collaboratingwith the efforts, using all of itsmod-
est capacity” (Abe Oi 2011b) but gave no further details although bank accounts
for receiving donations were already set up. Solidarity in this context meant po-
sitioning oneself in a political context. The messages to Brazilian nikkei in Japan
and Brazil were more practical. They asked them to remain calm, inform their
relatives in Brazil when possible, and also announced the start of the campaign
“with the aim to find a form to show our solidarity to Japan” (Abe Oi 2011a).
These also invoked a sense of a larger (Japanese) community, assuring that “we
want to express profound solidarity because we share the great pain that over-
whelms the whole Japanese nation” (Abe Oi 2011a). These communiqués once
again established the organizers as responsible representatives of the Japanese-
Brazilian community, whether in Japan or Brazil. But by focusing on solidarity,
the organizers included the nikkei of Brazil in a concept of Japanese community
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that surpassed national borders. This idea of a solidarity among Japanese is also
apparent in the way donations were given and received.
A donor could theoretically just transfer the money to the bank accounts cre-
ated for this occasion. This procedure would be much easier, more transparent
and even safer for all parties concerned. However, many donations from the
nikkei community were made in person, and especially those coming from Japa-
nese associations, clubs and circles (nihonjinkai) followed a very similar pattern;
when those donors came to the Bunkyo building in Liberdade to deliver their
contribution, they were received by Bunkyo’s president, Kihatiro Kita, or a col-
league from the administration. As the donor formally delivered the check, the
Bunkyo staff took pictures and posted a report online afterwards. The donors
in this situation presented themselves as participants and expressed their (ex-
pected) solidarity with Japan, further confirmed by pictures, reports and dona-
tion receipts. Donating money became a performative act in which members of
this group confirmed their right to belong. Solidarity in this sense was shown
and proven.
4 Reacting to 3/11: Solidarity with the Japanese
The donors to the general campaign to help Japan ranged from individuals and
Japanese associations from the interior of São Paulo state to sport clubs, cultural
institutions and nikkei-owned companies. The Bunkyo homepage functioned as
an official forum that presented these contributors and their reasons to partic-
ipate. Especially among smaller contributors, help for Japan was explained as
help to a group they considered themselves to be a part of, the group of “Japa-
nese”. This idea of solidarity expands from a humanitarian idea to a very specific
feeling of solidarity within a group. The opposite of Gayatri Spivak’s concept of
“othering” (Spivak 1985), this process might be called “ouring”. Participating in
the campaign meant demonstrating one’s own link to Japan and identifying as
Japanese among the community in Brazil.
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The association Shimbokukai e Fujinkai de Vila Santa Izabel donated the rela-
tively small sum of about $ 1,500.⁴ In the interview on the Bunkyo homepage,
the three female representatives of the Fujinkai framed their participation as a
natural act: “We are very grateful to Japan, and this is the moment to return the
favor to the country our ancestors came from and where our children now live”
(Abe-Oi 2011d). References to family ties run through the whole interview: to
help Japan meant to help “our Japanese brothers and sisters”. The speakers de-
fine themselves as members of this Japanese family that includes Brazilian nikkei
in Japan (Abe-Oi 2011d). In contrast to larger contributions that resulted from
refined campaigning, the example of the Fujinkai also shows participation on a
smaller scale. The Fujinkai is located in southern São Paulo and operates in a
modest neighborhood with few families of Japanese ancestry. Its members are
mostly elderly Nisei and the association functions as a contact point for their
informal activities, such as karaoke, Japanese language classes, rajio taisō (radio
gymnastics) and bingo games. Aside from the actual amount of the contribution,
there also exists an emotional meaning. The money came not from a specific
campaign but from the personal savings account of the Fujinkai. The contribu-
tion was thus understood as a sort of familial legacy. The members of Fujinkai
explained that its money should be better used to help Japan since their “associ-
ation will not survive for much longer” because of their own ages and missing
younger members (Abe-Oi 2011d).
In a way, the example of the Fujinkai symbolizes both status quo and actual
problems among São Paulo’s nikkei society. Although a large number of associa-
tions, groups and clubs exist, they experience a kind of recruitment problem con-
nected to a changed relationship to Japan. The contribution of the Fujinkai also
shows that participating meant including oneself and one’s organization within
a Japanese community, be it transnational with Japan or regional in São Paulo.
The catastrophes of 3/11 strengthened the relations between actors who worked
together for a common aim: helping Japan by providing donations. Their suc-
cess lies, therefore, less in the result of this collection and the sum of one million
⁴ To facilitate reading, this association for informal social gathering (shinbokukai) and its women’s
association (fujinkai) will be abbreviated to ”Fujinkai”.
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dollars butmore in the process of achieving it. Even though actors had organized
campaigns for other objectives in Brazil, like the flooding in Rio de Janeiro, the
“affected home” Japan added to the equation. Participating and donating meant
demonstrating solidarity while identifying as Japanese and being recognized as
such by others. The expectation that Japanese were obligated to participate also
meant that those who were not present had denied their contribution, meaning
they would not identify themselves as Japanese. The nikkei community con-
structed their need to show solidarity not only from a humanitarian perspec-
tive but also as an obligation owed to one’s own group or family, which further
strengthened the process of “ouring” among the self-imposed category of “Japa-
nese”.
“Ouring” even extended to contributions from Brazilians without Japanese
ancestry. Their favorable image of “Japanese” and therefore motivation to help
was developed from the positive stereotypes about the nikkei in Brazil and espe-
cially in São Paulo. They directly linked the Japanese in Japan to the nikkei in
Brazil, as a contact recalled the reasoning of one donor in particular:
There was a woman, who came here right after the events of our campaign
started and who we perceived to be a simple domestic maid [...] and she gave
twenty Reais [about $ 10]. She said: “No, I insist. This is all I’ve got, all that I
have left at this moment. But I insist. The Japanese are very correct, they are
very hard workers, they deserve that we help them” [...]
“So, you are familiar with Japan?”
“No, but I know you, and you [plural] are the best.”
Helpful as it may have been in the campaign, this form of performative and asso-
ciated solidarity also posed a problem. The categorization of Japanese through
donations became an open field that could and would be contested.
5 Reacting to 3/11: Friction and Conflict
The reaction of the nikkei community seems clear and well structured; existing
institutions and their representatives assumed responsibility, organized a joint
campaign, while individuals and associations contributed with financial dona-
tions that were distributed. Help was therefore provided to Japan. But who was
allowed to organize campaigns and represent the community? While the variety
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of campaigns was remarkable, this also led to problems of differentiating be-
tween them. Even those five organizations coordinating the campaign together
used different names: Campaign to Collect for the Victims, Nippon Gambare,
and SOS Japão. Among nikkei and non-nikkei contributors, there was appar-
ently not only a great desire to help but also a feeling of uncertainty regarding
who was authorized to collect the donations. All official documents and press
releases warned that no one was allowed to gather donations in person, but as
one incident proved, there were those who used ethnicity and this solidarity as a
cover for criminal gains.
Rosário Kazuhaki Yamamoto is a known Japanese-Brazilian con artist who al-
ready had posed as a distant relative of Japan’s Imperial family to obtain money
during the commemoration of Japanese immigration to Brazil in 2008. In 2011,
he re-appeared in Liberdade wearing a doctor’s coat and pretended to be a repre-
sentative of an association participating in the campaign. He successfully lured
businessmen into sponsoring a fictional fund-raising bazaar (São Paulo Shim-
bun 2011b). As one victim remarked afterwards, in addition to his doctor’s coat,
Yamamoto’s look as a Japanese-Brazilian also made him credible, even more so
because he spoke both Japanese and Portuguese. This attempt to capitalize on
the catastrophe was not just seen as an act of a criminal but taken as an “at-
tack on the community” (São Paulo Shimbun 2011b). This reaction shows the
fear thatmembers of the community themselves would besmirch the nationwide
campaign. Yamamoto’s example illustrates the warring question of who was al-
lowed to act and by extension speak for and represent the community. Friction
appeared within the community, and in tracing these moments a different per-
spective of the meaning of 3/11 can be drawn. Two examples of friction among
the community illustrate the variety of meanings.
The biggest contributor to the campaign was the religious sect Seichō-no-ie.
On April 4, its delegation visited the Bunkyo building and delivered a check of
about $ 250,000. The presentation of the donation to the presidents of Bunkyo,
Enkyo, and Kenren followed the routine of other donations: words of gratitude
were spoken and pictures of those involved taken. However, the circumstances
of this contribution were very different. Published pictures show a highly for-
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malized setting resembling a press conference with opposing groups and tables –
no other contributors were met like this. Most often, a member of the exec-
utive board of Bunkyo received donors, whereas this time, three presidents of
the organizing committee were present. Seichō-no-ie even brought a journalist
from their own journal, thus partly taking control of the presentation afterwards
when they published an account of the meeting on their own websites, adding
their own pictures and a link to an article about their donation (Seichō-no-ie
2011). This case suggests a different reason for participating in the campaign.
It can be concluded that donating in Seichō-no-ie’s case meant not only show-
ing one’s religious beliefs and solidarity with the Japanese but also presenting
oneself as an influential actor. While Seichō-no-ie is one of the Japanese “New
Religions” (shinshūkyō) which have gathered a large following in Brazil, its influ-
ence on society is also seen critically (Usarski-Shoji 2008: 3). Bunkyo and other
institutions are normally cautious towards religious organizations, but in this
case, they had to accept the donation and in doing so, also accept Seichō-no-ie
as an important part of campaign and community. Showing solidarity in this
case meant publicity and a marketing possibility because all news media of the
community reported the contribution. In contrast to this, the largest individual
donor who contributed about $ 100,000 chose not to identify himself (Abe-Oi
2011e). Seichō-no-ie’s use and distribution of their own material through their
own forms of media also demonstrates the focus on publicity because the pub-
lished report and pictures concentrate on the gratitude shown by the organizers
as representatives of the nikkei community.
In contrast to Seichō-no-ie’s example of pursuing one’s own agenda through
participating, the example of Liberdade’s shop owners association ACAL (As-
sociação Cultural e Assistencial da Liberdade) illustrates the effects of refusal.
If “being Japanese” meant collecting donations, then it became an impetus for
any nikkei organization. Those who refused to contribute in any way – not only
financially – to the campaign came under pressure. Shortly after the catastro-
phes, ACAL’s executive board send out a communiqué to its members and as-
sociates. It labeled any initiatives to collect donations “hasty”, arguing that Japan
had “enough financial and human resources to normalize the situation” (Shiguti
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2011b: 4). The message also stated that participating in any campaign would
be neither necessary nor wanted by the Japanese government. This drew heavy
criticism from the public, the media and ACALs own associates (Shiguti 2011b:
4). Participating was expected, and not surprisingly, some days later, ACAL or-
ganized its own one-day campaign in collaboration with the Red Cross (albeit
the Brazilian charter).⁵
6 TheMeaning of 3/11 for the Japanese Diaspora in Brazil
The Japanese-Brazilian community in São Paulo was a driving force behind ef-
forts to aid Japan after 3/11. It started various initiatives that providedmoral and
financial support. Nevertheless, to evaluate these contributions is a difficult and
contested question. Organizers such as Bunkyo president Kita considered the re-
sults a success that “surpassed [their] expectations” (Abe-Oi 2011e), but others
criticized both the campaigns and the motives to participate. Rodrigo Meikaru,
editor of the journalMundoOK, described it as “one event here, one event there,
but nothing big” and declared that “the Japanese-Brazilian community [...] did
not show great efforts to help Japan” (Meikaru 2011: 5). The journalist Nelson
Fukai saw a very different picture of “solidarity” when he compared reactions in
Japan andBrazil, addressing that participating in Brazil wasmainly used for pub-
licity: “Here in Brazil, mainly in the nikkei [sic!] community..., what a shame!
Solidarity yes, for those who want to present themselves!” (Fukai 2011). Com-
pared to the sum collected on a global scale, the sum of about onemillion dollars
(about three million Brazilian Reais) from private donations ought to be consid-
ered symbolic, as a member of the Bunkyo staff confirmed: “We know that three
million [Reais] were not sufficient at all but [meant to] […] demonstrate a feeling
of solidarity” (2011, 021-230).⁶ It can be argued that the process of collecting and
its impact on the community was more important than the donated sum itself.
⁵ This short-term solution was criticized because the Brazilian charter of the Red Cross charged ten
percent of the collected money as an administration fee. Since late 2011 the Brazilian charter has
also been under suspicion for possible embezzlement of funds with the campaign for the victims
of 3/11 being among those investigated (Leitão, 2012).
⁶ a gente sabe que tres milhões não deu para nada, mas […] demonstrar um sentimento, ne de
soliedaridade (2011, 021-023).
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On the one hand, the main campaign cemented the claim of established in-
stitutions such as Bunkyō and the kenjinkai to represent the nikkei community
and made them more visible. Participating meant constructing one’s identity as
being Japanese. The public campaigning for donations and its “ouring” as an
expression of ethnic solidarity also meant mobilizing broader audiences, both
non-nikkei and nikkei, which resulted in the “strengthening [not only] of local
relations but also of relations inside the community as well as with local [Brazil-
ian] society”, as a Bunkyō contact stated.⁷ Participating in the campaign also had
an impact on power relationships, either gaining (positive) publicity or sanctions
from a refusal. While the act of donating was publicly acknowledged (and partly
self-presented), the amount of money could also serve as a confirmation of one’s
own relevance and power in contrast to others. It may be concluded that the
catastrophes of 3/11 were a tragic event in which the Brazilian nikkei diaspora
experienced and constructed its connection to Japan: on the one hand, inter-
nally through its own efforts with campaigns, and on the other hand, externally
through the attention of non-nikkei society, which supported and expected this
symbolic show of solidarity with Japan.
This leads to a general question of how diasporic communities respond to
disasters in their (ethnic) homeland. As shown in this article, disasters can be
seen as experiences of a connection to one’s homeland, tragically conforming
to Safran’s idea of relating and restoring. Regardless of geographic locations,
modern media supplies pictures and other impressions that trigger reactions.
Solidarity and its various forms of expressions, varying from financial donations
to public demonstrations, become an externally and internally expected reac-
tion. Identity is constructed from the periphery through internal “ouring” but
may be confirmed by external opinions.
The catastrophes of 3/11 had global repercussions on the Japanese diaspora.
It may be argued that they became part of the diaspora’s history and in this sense
ought to be remembered. InMarch 2012, two nikkei organizations supported by
Mitsubishi and the city of São Paulo began to plan amemorial. Twenty thousand
⁷ ”um fortalecimento das relações locais mas também dessas relações dentro da comunidade como
também da sociedade local” (2011, 002).
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tree seedlings, representing the number of assumed victims, are to be planted in
a park in the Eastern district of São Paulo (JornalNippak 2012). So far, donations
are still being collected, but naming thismemorial the ”Kizuna ParkBrazil Japan”
(Bosque Kizuná Brasil Japão) shows a close orientation toward the discourse of
Japanese politics and of “bonds between people” (kizuna) in the reactions to the
catastrophes in Japan (Tagsold, 2012). It remains to be seen how the catastrophes
of 3/11 will be seen and remembered not only in São Paulo but also in other
diasporic nikkei communities.
Literature
Abe Oi, Célia. (2011a): “Manifesto de Soliedaridade ao Japão da comunidade nipo-
brasileira” [Manifest of solidarity with Japan from the Japanese-Brazilian commu-
nity]; http://www.bunkyo.bunkyonet.org.br/index.php’’option=comcontent&view=arti
cle&id=1033%3Amanifesto-de-solidariedade-do-japao-da-comunidade-nipo-brasileira&c
atid=84%3Aterremoto-2011&Itemid=122&lang=br. (accessed October 12 2014)
AbeOi, Célia. (2011b): “Do Brasil, aMensagem de Solidariedade aos Japoneses” [AMes-
sage of Solidarity to the Japanese from Brazil]; http://www.bunkyo.bunkyonet.org.br/in
dex.php’’option=comcontent&view=article&id=1035%3Ado-brasil-a-mensagem-de-so
lidariedade-aos-japoneses&catid=84%3Aterremoto-2011&Itemid=122&lang=br. (ac-
cessed October 14, 2014)
Abe Oi, Célia. (2011c): “Cruz Vermelha do Japão receberá a arrecadação da campanha
em prol das vítimas do terremoto” [Red Cross of Japan Will Receive the Collection
of the Campaign on Behalf of the Victims of the Earthquake]; http://www.bunkyo.bun
kyonet.org.br/index.php’’option=comcontent&view=article&id=1047%3Acruz-vermel
ha-do-japao-recebera-a-arrecadacao-da-campanha-em-prol-das-vitimas&catid=84%3Ate
rremoto-2011&Itemid=122&lang=br. (accessed October 14, 2014)
Abe Oi, Célia. (2011d): “Vila Santa Izabel na Campanha de Arrecadação às Vítimas do





Abe-Oi, Célia. (2011e): “Resultado final da Campanha em prol das vítimas do terre-
moto no Japão” [Final Result of the Campaign for the Victims of the Earthquale in
Japan]; http://www.kenren.org.br/noticias/not%C3%ADcias-relacionadas/item/67-result
112
Disaster, Donations, and Diaspora
ado-final-da-campanha-em-prol-das-v%C3%ADtimas-do-terremoto-no-japão. (accessed
October 29, 2014)
Adachi, Nobuko. 2004. “Japonês: A Marker of Social Class or a Key Term in the Dis-
course of Race”. In: Latin American Perspectives, 31 (3): pp. 48–76.
Adachi, Nobuko. 2006. “Theorizing Japanese Diaspora” In: Adachi, Nobuko. (ed.):
Japanese Diasporas: Unsung Pasts, Conflicting Presents and Uncertain Futures. New
York: Routledge, pp. 1–22.
Beltrão, Kaizō et al. 2008. “Haíne: Raízes [Roots].” Curitiba: Associação Brasileira de
Dekasseguis.
Blog do Planalto. 2011. “Presidenta Dilma coloca o Brasil à disposição do gov-
erno japonês após terremoto” [President Dilma Places Brazil at Disposal of the Ja-
panese Government after Earthquake]; http://blog.planalto.gov.br/presidenta-dilma-co
loca-o-brasil-a-disposicao-do-governo-japones-apos-terremoto. (accessed July 26, 2014)
Brody, Betsy Teresa. 2002. Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalization in Japan. London:
Routledge.
Fukai, Nelson. 2011. “O marketing de disgraça” [Shameful Marketing]. In: Mundo OK:
4.
Handa, Tomoo. 1987. O imigrante Japonês – História de sua vida no Brasil [The Ja-
panese Immigrant - History of His Life in Brazil]. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos
Nipo-Brasileiros.
Harada, Kiyoshi. 2010. “A Presença do Nikkei no Cenário Nacional” [Presence of
Nikkeis on the National Scenario]. In: Various. Centenário: Contribuição da Imi-
gração Japonesa para o Brasil Moderno e Multicultural [Centenário: Contributions of
the Japanese Immigration to Brasil Modern and Multicultural]. São Paulo: Paulo’s
Comunicação e Artes Gráficas, pp. 223–235.
Houaiss, Antōnio and; Villar, Mauro de Salles. 2001. Dicionário Houaiss da Língua
Portuguesa. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva.
Jornal Nippak. 2012. “Convite ABIJA e OISCA – Plantio de árvores dia 17/03/2012”
[Invitation ABIJA and OISCA – Planting of Trees at 17/03/2012]; http://www.port
alnikkei.com.br/convite-abija-e-oisca-plantio-de-arvores-dia-17032012/. (accessed Au-
gust 19, 2014)
Leitão, Leslie. 2012. “S.O.S. Cruz Vermelha” [S.O.S. Red Cross], VEJA 2281, 8.8.2012,
pp. 120–123.
Lesser, Jeffrey. 2007. A Discontented Diaspora: Japanese Brazilians and the Meanings of
Ethnic Militancy, 1960–1980. Durham: Duke University Press.




Okada, Norio et al. 2011. “The 2011 Eastern JapanGreat EarthquakeDisaster: Overview
and Comments”. In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 2 (1): pp. 34–42.
Reis, Maria Edileuza Fontanele. 2002. Brasileiros no Japao: o elo humano das relacoes
bilaterais [Brazilians in Japan: The Human Tie of the Bilateral Relationship]. São
Paulo: Kaleidus-Primus. 2nd revised edition.
Rosso, Paulo Sergio. 2007. “Solidariedade e direitos fundamentais na Constituição
Brasileira de 1988” [Solidarity and Fundamental Rights in the Brazilian Constitu-
tion of 1988]. In: Revista Eletrōnica do Centro de Estudos Jurídicos/CEJUR, 1 (2): pp.
201–222.
São Paulo Shimbun. 1995a. “Morte e sofrimento no rastro do terremoto” [Death and
Suffering in the Wake of the Earthquake]. 18.1.1995.
São Paulo Shimbun. 1995b. “A soliedaridade da comunidade” [The solidarity of the
Community]. 20.1.1995.
São Paulo Shimbun. 1995c. “Brasileiros estão sendo atendidos em Osaka” [Brazilians
Are Treated in Osaka]. 2.2.1995.
São Paulo Shimbun. 1995d. 04.02.1995.
São Paulo Shimbun. 2011a. “Brasil doa US$ 500 mil e Japão agradece” [Brazil Donates
500.000 US$ and Japan Gives Thanks]. 22 March; http://www.saopauloshimbun.com/
sitebr.php/conteudo/show/id/1079/menu/31/cat/112. (accessed June 2, 2014)
São Paulo Shimbun. 2011b. “Estelionatário volta a atacar a comunidade usando o nome
do São Paulo Shimbun” [Trickster Returns to Attack the Community Using the Name
of SãO Paulo Shimbun]. August 29; http://www.saopauloshimbun.com/sitebr.php/con
teudo/show/id/1450/menu/33/cat/115. (accessed October 15, 2014)
Safran, William. 1991. “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Re-
turn”. In: Diaspora, 1 (1): pp. 83–99.
Seichō-no-ie. 2011. “SEICHO-NO-IE DO BRASIL faz entrega de doação que será en-
caminhada às vítimas do terremoto e tsunami do Japão” [Seichō-No-Ie Delivers the
Donation Which Will Be Sent to Victims of the Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan];
http://www.sni.org.br/SEICHO-NO-IE-DO-BRASIL-faz-entrega-de-doacao-que-sera-enca
minhada-as-vitimas-do-terremoto-e-tsunami-do-Japao.asp. (accessed August 29, 2014)
Shiguti, Aldo. 2011a. “O pânico maior é por parte dos estrangeiros, diz Hashimoto”
[The Bigger Panic Comes from the Foreigners, Says Hashimoto]. In: Jornal Nippak,
17-23.03.2011.
Shiguti, Aldo. 2011b. “Acal se retrata por informe ‘equivocado’ sobre campanhas”
[Acal Recants “Mistaken“ Information about Campaigns]. In: Jornal Nippak, 31.3.-
06.04.2011.
Spivak, Gayatari. 1985. “The Rani of Simur”. In: Barker, Francis et al (eds.): Europe and
its Others. Colchester: University of Sussex.
114
Disaster, Donations, and Diaspora
Tagsold, Christian. 2012. “Kizuna: Das Schriftzeichen des Jahres 2011 als Antwort auf
das gefühlte Auseinanderbrechen der Gesellschaft” [Kizuna: The Kanji of the Year
2011 as an Answer to the Angst That Japanese Society Will Soon Break Apart]. In:
Japan Jahrbuch: pp. 309–328.
Takezawa, Yasuko. 2002. “Nikkeijin and Multicultural Coexistence in Japan.” In: Hira-
bayashi, Lane Ryo: New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and People of Japanese De-
scent in the Americas and from Latin America in Japan, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, pp. 310–330.
Usarski, Frank; and Shoji, Raphael. 2008. “Japanese Religions in Brazil”. In: Japanese
Journal of Religious Studies, 35 (1): pp. 1–12.
115
About the Authors
Niko Besnier is Professor of Cultural Anthropology at the Department of Sociology &
Anthropology, University of Amsterdam
Peter Bernardi is a PHD candidate at the Department for Modern Japan, Heinrich
Heine University Düsseldorf
RuthMartin is ResearchAssociate at the Europe JapanResearchCentre, OxfordBrookes
University
Andreas Niehaus is Associate Professor at the Department for Japanese Language and
Culture, Ghent University
Christian Tagsold is Associate Professor at the Department for Modern Japan, Hein-
rich Heine University Düsseldorf
Jutta Teuwsen is a Research Fellow at the Department for Modern Japan, Heinrich
Heine University Düsseldorf
Tine Walravens is Teaching and Research Assistant at the Department of Languages
and Cultures Department / Japanese Language and Culture, Ghent University
116


